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I. INTRODUCTION
Glenn Gold had a hard choice to make: where to attend law school. 
Considering his alternatives, he decided on the Bridgeport School of Law, 
claiming to have relied particularly on the Dean’s boast of a “friendly interaction” 
between students and professors.1 Gold—like many aspiring lawyers—would soon 
meet a professor who “bombarded him with questions that culminated in a violent 
vocal outburst when he perceived that [Gold] had not properly prepared for 
class.”2 After his first year, when the school dismissed him for failing to maintain a 
minimum grade point average, Gold sued for fraud. 
A jury found for Gold, but the Appellate Court of Connecticut reversed, 
holding that the challenged statements were “akin to mere ‘puffing’” and could not 
give “rise to liability.”3 Why? Because, “‘favorable comments by sellers with 
respect to their products are universally accepted and expected in the market- 
place.’”4 That is, Bridgeport won because—in the court’s view—it is incredible 
that law students and their professors will get along, even though the school had 
allegedly sold itself based on that very quality. 
We are constantly exposed to speech like that of Bridgeport, encouraging us 
to buy goods, invest in stocks, and transact for services. This speech is often 
intentionally misleading, is usually vivid and memorable, and induces many of us 
to rely on it. But the law, which normally punishes lies for profit, encourages this 
speech by immunizing it as “mere puffery.” “Puffery” is an increasingly important 
defense against criminal and civil actions in common law and regulatory settings, 
resulting in thousands of citations in cases and law reviews.5 However, puffery 
doctrine, a major element of the law of fraud and promissory obligation, is missing 
an explanatory theory.6 
Most scholarly discussions of puffery have focused on one of the many 
discrete legal regimes in which puffery arguments are articulated:7 e.g., mail 
fraud,8 securities fraud,9 common-law fraud,10 legal ethics,11 common-law 
1. Gold v. Univ. of Bridgeport Sch. of Law, 562 A.2d 570, 572 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). 
2. Id. at 573. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. (quoting Web Press Servs. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 533 A.2d 1211, 1213
(Conn. 1987)). 
5. A search in the Westlaw “JLR” database alone for “puff or puffing or puffery” produces
3,182 citations. A search in the “ALLCASES” database returns 5,695 uses of those terms in caselaw. 
6. But cf. IVAN PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLOW-UP (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing puffery
across areas of law); Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657 (1985) 
(articulating a theory of deception in advertising law). 
7. Preston, whose authoritative work is the foundation of modern attempts to study puffing
speech, does not give a full treatment of such speech’s potential benefits, and he does not set out to tie 
his experimental and historical evidence to a normative theory of the law of fraud or promise. See 
generally PRESTON, supra note 6. 
8. Ryan Y. Blumel, Mail and Wire Fraud, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 677, 689 (2005) (linking
findings of puffery to a seller’s “good faith”). 
9. See generally Jennifer O’Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence
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contracts,12 Uniform Commercial Code warranty cases,13 promissory 
misrepresentation,14 false advertising,15 and even law-review-publication 
decisions.16 Such articles are usually directed at practitioners and tell a simple 
story. Puffery is a “vague statement” boosting the appeal of a service or product 
that, because of its vagueness and unreliability, is immunized from regulation. 
Unfortunately, according to the story, judges sometimes are inconsistent in 
applying the “vague statement” standard;17 therefore, risk-averse clients would be 
well-advised to avoid hyperbolic posturing as much as possible. 
Because each legal context where puffery appears serves quite different ends, 
it is possible to see courts’ use of the word “puffery” as an example of convergent 
evolution.18 That is, there is no core theme unifying applications of the puffery 
defense. Such concerns have led many jurists to conclude that the puffery defense 
is lawless.19 This view is simply wrong. 
of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697 (1998) (linking 
findings of puffery to the nature of securities disclosures). 
10. Richard P. Perna, Deceitful Employers: Common Law Fraud as a Mechanism to Remedy
Intentional Employer Misrepresentation in Hiring, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 233, 262–75 (2005) 
(criticizing courts for their incoherent application of the puffery defense to intentional torts, and 
synthesizing the doctrine and finding similarities in the application of the defense). 
11. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2002)
(analyzing the constitutional and doctrinal footings of professional codes prohibiting puffery by 
lawyers). 
12. Keith A. Rowley, You Asked For It, You Got It . . . Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes, Prizes, and
Contract Law, 3 NEV. L.J. 526, 543 (2003) (discussing “sham” or “joke” offers). 
13. Cf. Joshua Honigwachs, Is It Safe to Call Something Safe? The Law of Puffing in Advertising,
6 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 157, 163 (1987) (comparing UCC warranty cases with the false-advertising 
regime). 
14. Joe E. Manuel & Stuart F. James, Tennessee’s Theories of Misrepresentation, 22 MEM. ST. U.
L. REV. 633, 650 (1992) (“The practical effect of promissory misrepresentation may be that, in some
instances, typical sales talk and puffery is [sic] elevated to a level of actionable misrepresentation.”). 
15. Courtland L. Reichman & M. Melissa Cannady, False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 21
FRANCHISE L.J. 187, 189 (2002) (discussing the difficulty in distinguishing puffery from actionable 
advertising). 
16. See generally Ross E. Davies, The Most Important Article of All Time, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 351
(2002) (extolling the role of puffery in placement of law-review articles). 
17. Sometimes regulators are inconsistent as well. 
18. Convergent evolution is the biological hypothesis that “different organisms may develop
similar features through adaptations when faced with similar environments or architectural demands.” 
Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government’s Power to 
Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 143 (2003). 
19. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Regulating Information: Advertising Overview, in THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR 222, 235 
(Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris eds., 1981) (describing the FTC puffery doctrine as 
“practically def[ying] description” and a “matter of unstated prosecutorial discretion”); C. Edward 
Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1097 
(arguing that courts’ treatment of puffery and sophisticated investors “results in unsatisfying, 
unprincipled, and almost incoherent caselaw”); Richard J. Leighton, Making Puffery Determinations in 
Lanham Act False Advertising Cases: Surveys, Dictionaries, Judicial Edicts and Materiality Tests, 95 
TRADEMARK REP. 615, 618 (2005) (discussing incoherence in Lanham Act cases). 
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The basic claim I explore in this Article is that when courts confront fraud 
claims, they do so guided by a view of “bad” and “good” consumption.20 Courts 
seek to discourage speech leading to “bad” consumption and to protect speech 
leading to “good” consumption.21 Courts believe that “bad consumption” happens 
when consumers purchase something as a result of believing false facts stated or 
implied by commercial speech. “Good consumption” is purchasing in the absence 
of false facts. Thus, the law views the consumption process as rational and factual, 
and it seeks to protect regretted purchasing decisions through liability and 
regulation only when those decisions are influenced by untruthful sellers’ speech. 
The “puffery defense” functions to draw a line between lawful and unlawful 
speech, based on legal authorities’ assumptions about the rationality of 
consumption. To the extent that regulators and courts believe that some speech 
produced consumption that could not possibly have been “bad” (consumers could 
not have relied on the speech, or it implied no false facts), the law is more likely to 
label that speech “puffery” and immunize it. By contrast, if the speech could 
produce “bad” consumption, then the puffery defense will fail. Thus, the defense is 
an implicit indication of what legal authorities perceive as the motivation behind 
economic transactions. 
Therefore, rule-of-law objections to the puffery defense are misdirected. The 
problem with puffery doctrine is not doctrinal chaos; courts and regulators have 
simply chosen a normative target that they are institutionally ill-suited to hit. In 
this context, walking the line between overdeterrence of speech and 
underdeterrence of fraud turns out to be beyond courts’ competence. This 
institutional incapacity, coupled with a traditional fear of overregulating speech, 
leads authorities to overprotect commercial speech from liability. 
Part II of this Article begins to deconstruct the myth of the puffery defense’s 
incoherence by analyzing its application in a number of common law and 
regulatory actions. By comparing uses of the puffery defense in false-advertising, 
securities, Uniform Commercial Code, and promissory estoppel settings, I unearth 
the implicit goals courts and regulators are advancing when they protect often 
wildly misleading speech. 
Part III of this Article considers whether current puffery doctrine is required 
by the First Amendment. The question is significant because it provides a baseline 
for reforms that would better tailor applications of the puffery defense to a realistic 
view of consumption. As the Supreme Court has held, the Free Speech Clause 
“requires that we protect some falsehood . . . to protect speech that matters.”22 Is 
20. I do not use consumption in its technical sense, i.e., the using-up of a resource. Instead, I am
using the word to refer to the decision to purchase both consumable goods and investment vehicles. 
That decision is obviously contestable and is made for the purposes of clarity in the text above. There is 
evidence, discussed below, that many investors treat stock purchasing as a process involving similar 
emotional factors as ordinary purchase decisions. 
21. By describing the courts’ view of good and bad consumption, I do not mean to imply
agreement that such a distinction is coherent or even desirable. 
22. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). 
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puffery the type of “falsehood” that must be protected under current First 
Amendment doctrine? We do not know, because no court has authoritatively 
resolved the issue, and also because scholarship to date has not considered the First 
Amendment implications of puffery doctrine. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is 
highly likely to confront the puffery problem, or a variant, in the near future as part 
of its unsettled commercial-speech jurisprudence.23 Thus, Part III develops a 
constitutional framework the Court could use when it considers future commercial-
speech cases involving puffery, and suggests how that framework ought to be 
applied to the regulatory and common-law contexts introduced in Part II. 
To the extent that puffery doctrine is not constitutionally required, is it good 
policy to immunize exaggerated commercial lies? I consider this question in Parts 
IV and V of this Article. 
Part IV considers the policy case for expanding the scope of puffery immunity 
using both rational and heterodox models of consumption. As I show, both models 
depend on assumptions about the relationship between puffery and purchasing 
decisions, which fail to describe actual behavior particularly well. I offer an 
alternative model of the relationship between puffing speech and consumption, 
based on a rich literature found in advertising and marketing journals. 
Part V demonstrates institutional problems with the current formulations of 
the puffery defense. Courts and regulators are bad at distinguishing speech that 
produces “good” or “bad” consumption because they systematically underestimate 
when consumers rely on hyperbolic speech and the extent to which this speech 
communicates facts. Instead of this problematic approach, I develop a novel model 
of puffery as a type of speech that implies false facts as an externality. I then offer 
a burden-shifting scheme of liability for puffery, which would force sellers to 
consider the consumption-distorting aspects of their speech as part of their 
expected liability costs. This approach would help courts and regulators to 
accomplish their line-drawing task by reducing the number of puffing claims in 
general, and by systematically providing decision makers with evidence on the 
puffery question. It would, therefore, significantly improve the policy and 
constitutional underpinnings of our consumer-protection laws. 
23. See infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text (citing and summarizing the issues in several
commercial free-speech cases). 
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II. WHAT IS PUFFERY?
Puffery has a common,24 a commercial,25 and a legal definition. Legally, the 
most significant characteristic of “puffery” is that it is a defense to a charge of 
misleading purchasers of goods, investments, or services, or to a charge that a 
promisor has made a legally cognizable promise. That defense, whether or not 
actually asserted by a commercial speaker, highlights the general rule that speech 
that misleads consumers is presumptively unlawful. Defendants in turn argue: 
“This speech, which would otherwise be unlawful because it is alleged to have 
misled consumption, could not have done so. It is puffery and should be immune 
from liability.” 
Applications of the puffery defense share two other telling characteristics. 
First, speech found to be puffery almost always seeks to encourage consumption, 
making optimistic claims about goods unsupported by observed reality.26 This is 
not to say that courts believe that sellers are never pessimistic about their products. 
Rather, they believe buyers will almost never actually buy because of misplaced 
seller pessimism: no one would purchase a car sold as “Not particularly zippy!”27 
Second, the puffery defense is related to a particular model of consumption, in 
which purchase decisions are reasonably made based on facts revealed by sellers. 
Thus, across the law, judges and regulators look for false facts uttered by sellers as 
the touchstone of their analyses. 
To explore these commonalities, I examine puffery defenses in four doctrinal 
contexts: federal false advertising; federal securities laws; the Uniform 
Commercial Code’s warranty provisions; and the scope of a “promise” in the 
contract/tort claim of promissory estoppel. I chose these three areas, from the many 
in which the puffery defense appears,28 for a number of reasons. Most 
24. Puffery is “exaggerated commendation especially for promotional purposes: Hype.” Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/puffery (last visited Feb. 12, 2006). 
25. A definition of puffery in a marketing text is:
Puffery: advertising copy that indulges in subjective exaggeration in its descriptions of a
product or service, such as “an outstanding piece of luggage.” Puffery is always a matter
of opinion on the part of the advertiser and often will use words such as “the best” or “the
greatest” in describing the good qualities of a product or service. Sometimes puffery is
extended into an exaggeration that is obviously untrue and becomes an outright parody,
such as, “This perfume will bring out the beast in every man!” 
JANE IMBLER & BETSY-ANN TOFFLER, DICTIONARY OF MARKETING TERMS 458 (2000). 
26. Optimism can exaggerate qualities a good has, or it can make claims about a good that no
reasonable person would credit. Jef I. Richards, A “New and Improved” View of Puffery, 9 J. PUB. 
POL’Y & MKTG. 73, 76–78 (1990); cf. Richard J. Leighton, Materiality and Puffing in Lanham Act 
False Advertising Cases: The Proofs, Presumptions, and Pretexts, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 585, 620–23 
(2004) (identifying two types of Lanham Act puffery as “Puffery by Exaggeration, Bluster, Boast or 
Humor” and “Puffery by Vagueness and/or Seller's Opinion”). 
27. In the absence of a purchase, there will be no grounds for liability under either a contract or
tort cause of action. 
28. Another classic application of puffery is the common-law action for misrepresentation,
synthesized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. A comment to the Restatement explains that "[t]he 
habit of vendors to exaggerate the advantages of the bargain that they are offering to make is a well 
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significantly, each area of law can be seen as a stop along a continuum from 
contract to tort law. As I explore in Part V of this Article, puffing speech presents 
an analogue to the externality problem most closely associated with tort law.29 It is 
interesting, therefore, to observe as I do in this Part that courts’ analysis of puffery 
is less satisfying in those areas of law that look more like “torts” than 
“contracts.”30 
A. THE PUFFERY DEFENSE IN FALSE-ADVERTISING CASES
Federal law31 protects consumers from misleading advertising through 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) suits32 and from private competitors’ 
deceptive advertising claims through Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.33 For our 
purposes, the anti-deception standards created by these different regimes are the 
same.34 
recognized fact.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 cmt. c, subsec. 2 (1977). Cases that arise 
under the Restatement turn on an analysis of whether the allegedly puffed service was “calculated to 
deceive and . . . made with intent to deceive,” and may be actionable even if otherwise nonactionable 
puffery. 9 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 32.26 (1992). One unique 
feature in misrepresentation cases is that the puffing question appears to sometimes go to the jury, 
instead of being resolved as a matter of law. See, e.g., Angelo Broad., Inc. v. Satellite Music Network, 
Inc., 836 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Tex. App. 1992) (holding that it was error not to submit a “puffery” 
instruction to the jury in a fraud case where some claims were potentially puffing and not actionable 
misrepresentation). 
29. See infra Part V (discussing puffery and persuasion). 
30. Additional reasons for these particular areas of law include: variety in courts’ application of
puffing speech; availability of a sufficient universe of cases from which to draw conclusions; practical 
significance; and the evident need for clarification in the law (in the securities arena particularly). 
31. For the purposes of this Article, I do not address “little FTC Acts” on a state-by-state basis.
See Debra Burke & E. Malcolm Abel, II, Franchising Fraud: The Continuing Need for Reform, 40 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 355, 375 (2003) (noting that “[a]ll states have passed Deceptive Trade Practices Acts, . . . . 
[which] are patterned after the FTC's statutory authority”). I also put to one side industry self-
regulation. The National Advertising Review Board sets the policies for the two main sources of 
advertising regulation: the National Advertising Division (NAD) and the Children’s Advertising Unit 
(CAU). The primary purposes of self-regulation are to ensure that (1) advertising is truthful, accurate, 
and not misleading or deceptive, (2) all claims are adequately substantiated, and (3) there is compliance 
with federal, state, and local laws and regulations. See generally Jeffrey S. Edelstein, Self-Regulation of 
Advertising: An Alternative to Litigation and Government Action, 43 IDEA 509 (2003). The NAD 
reviews and corrects only national advertisements. Its review seems relatively confined (3,800 total 
cases, of which only five percent are referred to the FTC). Id. The CAU is responsible for monitoring 
and reviewing national advertising directed at children under twelve. See generally CARU SELF-
REGULATORY GUIDELINES FOR CHILDREN’S ADVERTISING (7th ed. 2003), available at 
http://www.caru.org/guidelines/guidelines.pdf. 
32. Wheeler-Lea Act, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). A full list of statutes enforced by the FTC can be
found on its Web site at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stats.htm. Among the most important statutes are: The 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2000) (as amended) (empowering commission to 
prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce); and The Magnuson Moss Warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2000) (authorizing the FTC to 
develop regulations for implied and express warranties). 
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
34. See Ivan Preston, The Definition of Deceptiveness in Advertising and Other Commercial
Speech, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1035, 1040–41 (1990) (discussing elements of the Lanham Act and FTC 
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The purpose of false-advertising law is to ensure that consumers receive 
accurate information about products and services that are being sold.35 Through 
the media, advertisers provide information to consumers so that they can make 
meaningful choices and for that reason, misleading information can be dangerous 
to the consumer.36 When goods are praised to the point of untruth, “the result is 
not informed, intelligent choice, but rather its [sic] perversion; there is no ‘choice’ 
when selection is a function of competing untruths, deceits, and misleading 
comparisons.”37 Thus, the law judges deception based upon advertisements that, 
on a whole, are likely to mislead the general public.38 
The puffery defense in false-advertising cases protects accused defendant-
speakers whose speech is not factual, i.e., is of a type capable of being falsified.39 
The question of falsifiability is one of law,40 and courts and regulators routinely 
decide puffery problems by articulating a line between falsifiable and non-
falsifiable speech. This position arises from the FTC’s “Statement on Deception,” 
which does not use data to determine when speech is falsifiable.41 Instead, false-
advertising law defines the puffery defense categorically: claims “not capable of 
measurement” that “consumers would not take seriously.”42 This position is based 
on several assumptions. 
First, false-advertising authorities assume it is possible to distinguish factual 
from nonfactual speech by looking at the speech itself.43 
claims). 
35. See Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act,
79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 875 (1999) (offering the principal purposes of laws that restrict false advertising). 
36. Earl W. Kintner, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Advertising, 64 MICH. L. REV.
1269, 1272 (1966). 
37. Id. at 1270. 
38. See Patricia P. Bailey & Michael Pertschuk, The Law of Deception: The Past as Prologue, 33
AM. U. L. REV. 849, 851 (1984) (analyzing the legal standards for deception). 
39. Preston, supra note 34, at 1046. Finally, the claims must damage consumers or be likely to
damage them. Id. at 1047–48. 
40. Burns, supra note 35, at 867–69; see also Preston, supra note 34, at 1057–58 (discussing the
lack of a need for substantiation for those claims regulators find to be puffery). 
41. See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Letter from James C. Miller, III, FTC Comm’r, to
Representative John D. Dingell (Oct. 14, 1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-
decept.htm [hereinafter Statement on Deception]. 
42. In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 321 (1983) (emphasis added). 
43. This assumption has come under a significant amount of criticism by researchers who claim
that it is not easy to distinguish speech conveying factual claims from speech that does not, and that 
much of the speech that the FTC refers to as puffery in fact implies facts, which themselves might be 
false. See Ivan L. Preston, Researchers at the Federal Trade Commission—Peril and Promise, in 
COMMUNICATION RESEARCHERS AND POLICY-MAKING 511, 524 (Sandra Braman ed., 2003) 
[hereinafter Preston, Peril or Promise] (arguing that the FTC’s decision not to investigate puffery 
results from “institutional inertia,” not methodological impossibility); Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and 
Other “Loophole” Claims: How the Law’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy Condones Fraudulent 
Falsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & COM. 49, 57 (1998) [hereinafter Preston, Loophole Claims] (stating 
that the FTC views puffery as a “subcategory” of opinion statements that “convey[] no facts explicitly 
or impliedly and so cannot be deceptive”); Ivan L. Preston, Regulatory Positions Toward Advertising 
Puffery of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Federal Trade Commission, 16 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
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Second, the authorities assume “consumers acting reasonably” are unlikely to 
be deceived by speech-assertions that are not “capable of measurement.”44 As the 
FTC explained in its Statement on Deception, puffery is a subcategory of opinion 
statements that is unlikely to imply a statement of fact and that “ordinary 
consumers do not take seriously.”45 This particular assumption has led courts to 
focus on specificity as the key feature of the puffery defense, assuming that 
“consumer reliance will be induced by specific rather than general assertions.”46 
Third, the authorities assume that the speaker’s scienter bears on the strength 
of a speaker’s claim to immunity. For example, if the puffing speech helps to 
support a larger deceptive plan, the FTC grants that it might be actionable: 
“[s]tatements made for the purpose of deceiving prospective purchasers cannot 
properly be characterized as mere puffing.”47 This assumption embodies an 
underlying purpose of the federal false-advertising regime: to prevent savvy 
corporate actors from deliberately exploiting consumers’ vulnerabilities.48 
The first of these assumptions about factual versus nonfactual speech appears 
to cause the most problems in practice. Because neither courts nor regulators 
consider empirical evidence about which claims imply facts, their application of a 
nominally coherent doctrine creates a host of decisions in which relatively similar 
language receives different levels of protection. Almost every scholarly discussion 
of false-advertising puffery cases bemoans the doctrine’s incoherent aspects.49 
There is similar uncertainty in advertising-trade journals about the contours of 
puffery doctrine.50 
A few examples illustrate the confusion. Advil’s claim that it, “like Tylenol,” 
“doesn’t upset . . . [the] stomach” was found not to be immune puffery because a 
court believed that consumers would have viewed the statements to be a factual 
comparison with other brands.51 Similarly, a motor-oil company’s claim to provide 
“longer engine life and better engine protection” was not held to be puffery.52 By 
contrast, a puffery defense succeeded with respect to Bayer’s statement that it 
MKTG. 336, 337–38 (1997) [hereinafter Preston, Regulatory Positions] (criticizing the FTC for refusing 
to examine actual evidence of customer reaction to puffery as a part of its “definitional process”). 
44. Statement on Deception, supra note 41. 
45. Id. 
46. Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 96 C 1647, 1999 WL 495126, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999)
(summarizing courts’ applications of the puffery defense in false-advertising cases). 
47. In re Wilmington Chem. Corp., 69 F.T.C. 828, 865 (1966). 
48. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of false-advertising
law). 
49. See generally, e.g., Robert Pitosfsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the
Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977) (describing various shifts in the ideology 
underlying advertising regulation); see also supra note 19 (noting the numerous questions and 
inconsistencies in puffery doctrine). 
50. See, e.g., Barbara Metcalf et al., Identifying Misleading Advertising, 8 J. CONSUMER RES.
119, 119 (1981) (explaining that “determining whether an ad is misleading continues to prove difficult 
and controversial”). 
51. McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 819, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
52. Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 953 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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made the “the world’s best aspirin” that “works wonders.”53 And a videogame 
manufacturer escaped liability, despite claiming to have made “The Most 
Advanced Home Gaming System in the Universe.”54 The difference between these 
cases appears to rest on judges’ different understandings of when speech implies 
facts. In the latter two cases, judges were simply unwilling to, or incapable of, 
“constructing” facts from puffing speech that consumers could have either believed 
or disbelieved. 
Statements regarding nutritional benefits provide an interesting soufflé for 
puffery theorists. The claim that yogurt is “nature’s perfect food” apparently may 
be falsified and is not puffery.55 But, to enthusiasts’ chagrin, Nestlé’s boast that it 
sells the “very best chocolate” is a meaningless puff.56 If, upon eating too much 
chocolate yogurt, one needed a diet, the makers of topical gel could be liable for 
claiming to “dramatically interfere[] with the process of converting calories to fat” 
and “inhibit[] the creation of new fat cells.”57 But, the makers of a weight-loss pill 
trumpeting the drug’s ability to cause you to “Lose Weight Fast” would be 
protected.58 
Courts have even found puffery in statements that technically asserted facts 
when those facts were thought to be particularly unbelievable. Thus, when Colt 
defended the statement that its “Model P” handgun was the “gun that won the 
west” by arguing that the claim was unbelievable, a court accepted this puffery 
defense. The court helpfully explained that “an inanimate object, such as a gun, 
cannot literally win anything such as a war or the drive to colonize the western 
region of this country.”59 
That courts apply the puffery defense inconsistently on similar facts is 
obviously problematic. Not only does it create uncertainty for speakers, but it also 
raises rule-of-law objections to the entire regime of fraud regulation.60 Moreover, 
if courts wish to use the law of fraud to distinguish good from bad consumption-
inducing speech, the inability to coherently draw lines is troublesome. These 
concerns are relevant for other areas of law discussed below. 
53. In re Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395, § II.A.1 (1983). 
54. Atari Corp. v. 3DO Co., No. C 94-20298 RMW (EAI), 1994 WL 723601, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
May 16, 1994). 
55. In re Dannon Milk Prods., Inc., 61 F.T.C. 840, 840 (1962). 
56. See generally PRESTON, supra note 6, at 134–36 (collecting cases). 
57. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel at pt. B, In re Basic Research, No. 9318,
2004 WL 3142854 (F.T.C. Nov. 24, 2004). 
58. Thompson Med. Co. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1190, 1199–1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding that statements were puffery, even though package insert material suggested that consumers 
would lose up to 1.2 pounds per week). 
59. New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195, 235 (D. Conn. 
2004) (citations and internal footnotes omitted) (“Defendants argue that it is not true that Plaintiffs’ 
revolvers won the west and that the Winchester 73 rifle is the gun that won the west.”). 
60. For a lucid discussion of “rule of law” arguments, see Richard K. Greenstein, Why the Rule of 
Law, 66 LA. L. REV. 63, 69–75 (2005); but see Kaimipono D. Wenger & David A. Hoffman, 
Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1131–33 (critiquing the application of rule-of-law 
critiques as an aspect of law-reform scholarship). 
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B. THE PUFFERY DEFENSE IN SECURITIES CASES
Under the federal-securities-regulation framework, private and public 
plaintiffs seeking to recover for fraud must prove by a substantial likelihood that a 
suspect corporate disclosure omitted (or misrepresented) “material” facts.61 An 
“omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”62 Materiality 
“depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld 
or misrepresented information.”63 
The puffery defense in the securities context exists in the interpretative space 
created by this vague standard.64 In recent years, and despite hostility from 
scholars, defendants have been increasingly successful in obtaining dismissals 
based on puffery arguments.65 Formally, puffery is a “vague statement of 
corporate optimism”66 that is said to be “‘so obviously unimportant to a reasonable 
investor that reasonable minds could not differ.’”67 But a close reading of the 
puffery cases discloses that not all defendants’ arguments that their optimism was 
harmless are equally successful. It turns out that courts view optimism about the 
present with considerably more skepticism than optimism about the future.68 
61. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, IV SECURITIES REGULATION 2074–75 (3d ed. rev. 2000)
(stating that the materiality precedent is interchangeable in federal-securities laws); see also Yvonne 
Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of “Materiality” Under U.S. Federal Securities Laws, 40 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 663 (2004) (describing the close relationship between SEC materiality 
standard and Supreme Court caselaw). 
62. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976) (adopting this rule for 14a–9
proxy actions); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (adopting expressly “the TSC 
Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 context”). 
63. Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 240; see also David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational
Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 540–41 (2006) (summarizing the law of immateriality). 
64. Gregory Roussel, in 1998, suggested three ways that puffery might appear in materiality
analyses: a “vagueness standard” by which “facially vague” disclosures would be protected; a 
“guarantee” standard that protected all statements except those that warranted future performance; and a 
“contextual” standard that looks to the circumstances surrounding disclosure to determine materiality. 
R. Gregory Roussel, Note, Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement of the Corporate Puffery
Defense, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1057–64 (1998). The passage of time has tended to blur the
distinctions between these standards, although it is still true that jurisdictional variance is—and will
always be—an important factor in explaining case outcomes. 
65. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 61, at VII, 3424 (“[A]las, however, the puffing concept in
the securities context, which for decades had all but gone the way of the dodo, has recently experienced 
a revival.”); Hoffman, supra note 63, at 583 (using statistical analysis of 472 securities-law decisions 
and concluding that puffery has been used more over time in New York federal courts’ published 
opinions); see also O’Hare, supra note 9, at 1709–11 (examining a selection of cases and suggesting a 
rise in the application of puffery). 
66. See O’Hare, supra note 9, at 1697. 
67. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Goldman v. Belden,
754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
68. Cf. O’Hare, supra note 9, at 1737–38 (suggesting that vague, forward-looking statements
should be more immunized in the materiality doctrine than vague statements about present conditions). 
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Puffery finds its strongest expression in the context of forward-looking 
statements.69 Until 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission generally 
prohibited forward-looking statements by companies it regulated.70 Once that 
prohibition was relaxed, some questioned whether forward-looking statements 
could be actionable, because such projections might be seen as non-fraudulent 
opinions.71 The Supreme Court, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,72 put 
some doubts to rest with respect to opinions regarding current facts. Such opinions 
“rest on a factual basis that justifies them as accurate, the absence of which renders 
them misleading.”73 
Two years later, the Fourth Circuit, in Raab v. General Physics Corp.,74 
considered whether opinions about the future could similarly give rise to liability. 
In this first significant application of the puffery defense after Virginia 
Bankshares, the court evaluated two disclosures: (1) that certain future corporate 
earnings would be “in line with analysts’ current projections”; and (2) that “an 
expected annual growth rate of 10% to 30% over the next several years” with 
resulting “growth and success” would continue “well into the future.”75 Despite 
the allegation that these projections were intentionally and falsely made, the Fourth 
Circuit held they were immaterial puffery as a matter of law. 
The court justified this decision on two grounds. First, the court stated that 
the “market price of a share is not inflated by vague statements predicting growth . 
. . . No reasonable investor would rely on these statements . . . .”76 The court 
distinguished these kinds of predictions from “guarantees” that it said might be 
material. The court’s descriptive claim about investors’ reliance was unadorned by 
empirical evidence, such as non-movement in General Physics’ stock price after 
the disclosures. 
Second, the court advanced a policy argument: 
[P]redictions of future growth . . . will almost always prove to be wrong
in hindsight . . . . Imposing liability would put companies in a whipsaw, 
69. See No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. West Holding
Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that a “‘forward-looking statement’ is any statement 
regarding (1) financial projections, (2) plans and objectives of management for future operations, (3) 
future economic performance, or (4) the assumptions ‘underlying or related to’ any of these issues”). 
70. Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362,
[1972–1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,211, at 82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973) (“It has been 
the longstanding policy generally not to permit projections to be included in prospectuses and reports 
filed with the Commission.”). The Rule changed to permit forward-looking statements through safe-
harbor provisions. See Roussel, supra note 64, at 1055–56 and accompanying notes. 
71. See generally Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts’ Approach to Disclosure of Earnings
Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. 
REV. 1114, 1158–72 (1987) (discussing different judicial approaches). 
72. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). 
73. Id. at 1093. 
74. 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993). 
75. Id. at 288–91. 
76. Id. at 289. 
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with a lawsuit almost a certainty. Such liability would deter companies 
from discussing their prospects, and the securities markets would be 
deprived of the information those predictions offer.77 
The Raab court ignored the dissonance between an explanation that defined 
forward-looking puffery as speech that reasonable investors would ignore, and an 
explanation that depended on the informational value of such puffery to the 
securities markets. Nevertheless, following Raab,78 courts generally held that 
forward-looking puffery is only actionable if it creates a “substantial certainty” 
about the company’s predicted course or if the statement is made with “actual 
knowledge” that it is false.79 The end result is a doctrine that is quite protective of 
77. Id. at 290 (emphasis added). Notably, this precise problem was foreseen by Justice Powell, in
a 1975 concurring opinion: 
The stated purpose of the 1933 Act was ‘[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the 
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce . . . .’ See preamble to Act, 
48 Stat. 74. The evil addressed was the tendency of the seller to exaggerate, to ‘puff,’ and 
sometimes fraudulently to overstate the prospects and earning capabilities of the issuing 
corporation. The decade of the 1920’s was marked by financings in which the buying 
public was oversold, and often misled, by the buoyant optimism of issuers and 
underwriters. The 1933 Act was intended to compel moderation and caution in 
prospectuses, and this is precisely the way that Act has been administered by the SEC for 
more than 40 years. Precise factual accuracy with respect to a corporate enterprise is 
frequently impossible, except with respect to hard facts. The outcome of pending 
litigation, the effect of relatively new legislation, the possible enactment of adverse 
legislation, the cost of projected construction or of entering new markets, the expenditures 
needed to meet changing environmental regulations, the likelihood and effect of new 
competition or of new technology, and many similar matters of potential relevancy must 
be addressed in registration statements and prospectuses. In administering the 1933 Act, 
the SEC traditionally and consistently has encouraged and often required offerors to take 
conservative postures in prospectuses, especially with respect to judgmental and possibly 
unfavorable matters. If a different philosophy now were to be read into the 1934 Act, 
inviting litigation for arguably misleading understatement as well as for overstatement of 
the issuer’s prospects, the hazard of ‘going to market’—already not inconsequential—
would be immeasurably increased. 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 759 n.4 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). Blue Chip Stamps was a case involving the reverse-puffery problem, where an issuer 
had allegedly been unduly pessimistic about its prospects to certain protected potential shareholders to 
allow for a more lucrative public offering. The reverse-puffery problem—corporate depression—rarely 
invites litigation. However, in an interesting, forthcoming Article, Andrew Ward and Lyle Brenner have 
found that “acknowledging a negative quality led perceivers to evaluate that quality less negatively than 
when no acknowledgement was provided.” See Andrew Ward & Lyle Brenner, Accentuate the 
Negative: The Positive Effects of Negative Acknowledgement, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. (forthcoming 2006) 
(on file with the Iowa Law Review). The relationship between reverse puffery and positive puffery, and 
the explanation for their similar psychological effects, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
78. See, e.g., Parnes v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997). In Parnes, the
plaintiffs alleged that they had traded based on statements in Gateway’s prospectus predicting 
“significant growth” in the company’s earnings, when those statements were intentionally false. The 
court described these statements as “obvious hyperbole that no reasonable investor would rely upon,” 
because “the market price of a share is not inflated by vague statements predicting growth.” Id. at 547 
(citing Hillson Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 211, 213 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
79. See, e.g., In re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 F. App’x 296, 300 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a
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vague but intentionally false optimism about the future.80 Most reported appellate 
decisions in this arena favor defendants’ arguments.81 
The few decisions denying the puffery defense for forward-looking 
statements focus on the intersection between scienter and materiality.82 Statements 
forecast is actionably false if “‘there is no reasonable basis for the belief’” or “‘the speaker is aware of 
undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the statements’ accuracy’” (quoting Prounz v Miller, 
102 F.3d 1478, 1487 (9th Cir. 1996))); San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. 
Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that “even the most positive 
statements by Philip Morris representatives at that time consisted of relatively subdued general 
comments” and that “such puffery is not actionable”). 
80. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 1058, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 104th
Cong. (1995), provides additional safeguards for predictions under its “safe harbor” provision. 15 
U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (2000). The provision protects forward-looking statements that are (1) so-identified 
and accompanied by cautions; or (2) are themselves immaterial. See id. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A). Thus, as one 
author notes, the safe-harbor provision creates a space for judges to continue to apply precisely the 
same forward-looking materiality doctrine that had sprung up in advance of the Act’s passage. See 
Roussel, supra note 64, at 1082–83. 
81. See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 372 (5th Cir.
2004) (dismissing a claim in part on puffery grounds based on “positive statements about the 
company’s competitive strengths, experienced management, and future prospects”); Rombach v. 
Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that misstating a company’s growth, such as a 
statement that the company was “‘optimistic’” about future performance and was “‘working hard to 
complete [construction of entertainment facility],’” was puffery (quoting a March 1999 press release by 
the company)); Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 860, 869 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
statements, including one stating that a contract would “establish[] the company as a major participant 
in the Argentine water market” when the defendant did not have the financial capacity to become such a 
player, were immaterial puffery because, in part, “Azuri was under no duty to cast its business in a 
pejorative, rather than a positive, light”); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 537–38 (3d Cir. 
1999) (holding that statements expressing optimism such as “‘prospects with great potential for 
profitability,’” “‘superior cost structure,’” an “‘experienced management team,’” and “‘our credit 
quality remained excellent’” were immaterial puffery even where the company was aware of facts 
tending to suggest that the corporation’s financial situation was about to turn for the worse (quoting 
statements made by the company)); Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that “Gateway's prospectus of “‘significant growth’” was puffery (quoting the plaintiff’s 
complaint)); Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
statements such as a claim of “‘substantial success’” in post-merger integration, that the merger was 
“moving ‘faster than we thought,’” and that the company “‘expects that network applications will 
quickly reshape customer expectations’” were “the sort of soft, puffing statements, incapable of 
objective verification,” that should be dismissed as puffery); Lasker v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 85 
F.3d 55, 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding puffery where a company stated in its annual report that its
proposed diversification into marketing of software related to the natural-gas industry would “lead to
continued prosperity”); Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1066–67 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
predictions that further gains would be “high” were “best characterized as loose predictions” that lacked
sufficient definiteness to constitute a material representation); Harman v. Harper, Nos. 86-2916, 87-
1531, 1990 WL 121073, at *12 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 1990) (finding puffery where a business made
statements about property values and future events). 
82. See, e.g., Dunn v. Borta, 369 F.3d 421, 431 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that statements that the
company planned to introduce a product with specific characteristics were “not simply sales pitches”); 
Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 555–56 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (finding that statements that 
Vencor was “comfortable” with earning projections were “material reassurances of continued good 
fortune” and could not be determined to be immaterial as a matter of law); Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 
805, 808 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that a statement that an investment would be a “sure thing” was not 
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about current conditions are treated quite differently.83 Although courts will 
sometimes accept the puffery defense for disclosures evincing vague optimism 
about present facts,84 especially where the optimism concerns the corporation’s 
own products,85 courts will make the finding less frequently in the future-prospects 
context.86 
puffery when considered in the context of “misrepresentations of fact as to the future profitability of 
[and investments in] [the company] and the tax benefits that [it would produce]”). 
83. For an early discussion of vague puffing regarding present facts, see O’Hare, supra note 9, at 
1073–74. 
84. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 869–70 (holding that statements such as “our fundamentals 
are strong” and “[t]he pipeline of private transactions and announced public tenders that we are 
pursuing remains strong” were “obviously immaterial puffery”); Freedman v. Value Health, Inc., 34 F. 
App’x 408, 411 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that press-release statements that a corporation had reviewed the 
target company and reported that it had a “thriving business” were “at worst non-actionable puffery”); 
cf. Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 684 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that statements that 
“Food Lion is one of the best-managed high growth operators in the food retailing industry” were 
“immaterial puffery”); Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing 
present from future statements of opinion); Searls, 64 F.3d at 1066 (finding that a description of the 
company as “recession-resistant” was “too vague” to be material and was a statement that had a 
reasonable basis in fact); In re Royal Appliance Sec. Litig., No. 94-3284, 1995 WL 490131, at *3 (6th 
Cir. Aug. 15, 1995) (ruling that misrepresentation claims based on statements such as “‘Royal [is] on 
track to have a terrific year’ were properly dismissed”). 
85. See City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 670–71 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that statements such as a claim that the corporation sold the “best tires in the 
world,” that it had “global consistent quality,” that its sales success was due to “high regard among 
automakers for [its] strengths in product quality,” and that “[its] experience with Radial ATX indicates 
high consumer satisfaction with the quality and reliability of these tires” were “too squishy, too 
untethered to anything measurable, to communicate anything that a reasonable person would deem 
important to a securities investment decision”); see also In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 563, 
570 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that similar statements on a similar topic were “either mere corporate 
puffery or hyperbole that a reasonable investor would not view as significantly changing the general 
gist of available information”). The Ford court noted that “[a]ll public companies praise their products 
and their objectives. Courts everywhere ‘have demonstrated a willingness to find immaterial as a matter 
of law a certain kind of rosy affirmation commonly heard from corporate managers and numbingly 
familiar to the marketplace . . . .’” Id. at 570–71 (quoting Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 
1217 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
86. For example, in Beloit Corp. v. Emett & Chandler Cos., No. 90-55154, 1991 WL 153459, at 
*3 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991), the court considered the defendant’s argument that a statement that existing 
financial reserves were “very adequate” was puffery. The court, notably, treated the statement as a 
description of the present, although it could have been conceived of merely as a prediction about the 
future adequacy of the reserves in light of economic conditions not then extant. Although the statement 
standing alone was “of questionable import,” the court did not uphold its dismissal. Instead, it looked to 
the context of the disclosure, notably other alleged misrepresentations of a more definite character. The 
court held that present-tense speech should be evaluated to see if it is an “integral part” of a large 
scheme to “induce reliance.” Id.; see also Dunn, 369 F.3d at 431 (finding that a seller’s allegations of 
specific sales figures, when they were not in negotiations with major consumers, were not mere sales 
talk but rather “can be proven true or false”); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 315 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that statements that a company’s inventory was “in good shape” or “under control,” in the face 
of alleged knowledge that these statements were untrue, were “plainly false and misleading” and not 
puffery); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 201 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming a district-
court holding, as not clearly erroneous, that claims that a brokerage firm’s “research department” was 
extensive and well trained, when, in fact, the research department contained one individual who only
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This synthesis suggests that the puffery defense in the securities context 
operates on two tracks. Puffing about the future is almost always immune because 
courts decide that such disclosures should not affect consumption. By contrast, 
puffing about current conditions is analyzed closely to determine its effect on 
actual purchasing decisions. 
C. THE PUFFERY DEFENSE IN UCC WARRANTY CASES
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313 codifies the creation of warranties during 
the sale of goods.87 Such warranties occur when (1) sellers affirm a fact or 
promise, that (2) relates to the goods being sold, and (3) becomes part of the basis 
of the bargain between the parties.88 However, “an affirmation merely of the value 
of the goods, or a statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or 
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.”89 Comments to the Code 
acknowledge that some opinion statements will be treated as warranties;90 the 
Code directs courts to look to the circumstances of selling statements, asking if the 
buyer was reasonable in believing the statement and relying on it.91 Courts deem 
statements that could not induce reasonable reliance to be nonactionable puffery.92 
In the 1995 version of their treatise, White and Summers noted that:  
Only a foolish lawyer will be quick to label a seller’s statement as puffs 
“researched” securities the firm had underwritten, were not puffery). A good example of the rigor that 
courts use to evaluate present-tense puffery claims is Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1212–14 (considering a 
“[statement that the] financial reserve . . . is adequate to cover presently planned restructuring actions” 
and concluding that the statement was neither too vague in itself nor sufficiently surrounded by specific 
disclaiming caution to escape liability as a matter of law). 
87. The UCC is continually undergoing revision. Article 2, in particular, has endured substantial
debate, mainly because advances in technology have changed the way that contracts are formed and 
completed. See generally Thomas L. Lockhart & Patrick A. Miles, Jr., Computer Law: No More Pulp 
Fiction: Proposed UCC Article 2 Revisions Embrace Paperless Electronic Transactions, 75 MICH. B.J. 
516 (1996). In 2002 and 2003, Amended Article 2 was passed by the American Law Institute and then 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, but it is unlikely that the states 
will adopt this amendment any time soon. See James J. White, Revised Article 1 and the Warranty 
Provisions of Amended Article 2, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 519, 521 (2005) (discussing the revisions 
to Article 2 and stating that “it will be a long time before any substantial part gets adopted in any 
state”). 
88. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1977); see also Royal Bus. Mach. v. Lorraine, 633 F.2d 34, 41 (7th Cir.
1980) (stating that “when each of these three elements is present, a warranty is created that the goods 
shall conform to the affirmation of fact or to the promise”). 
89. U.C.C. § 2-313(2). 
90. For example, the Code will treat such statements as warranties when the statements are part of
the basis of the bargain or when the seller is holding himself out as an expert. See U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 
8. 
91. See Honigwachs, supra note 13, at 163 (using examples of warranty cases that demonstrate
that judges rule differently on a puffery determination based on factors other than the claim at issue, due 
to the leeway judges have in interpreting the provisions of U.C.C. § 2-313). 
92. See Alexander Simonson & Morris B. Holbrook, Permissible Puffery Versus Actionable
Warranty in Advertising and Salestalk: An Empirical Investigation, 12(2) J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 216, 
218 (1993) (describing the UCC approach as a “case-by-case” method, mixing objective and subjective 
accounts of appropriate buyer behavior). 
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or not puffs, and only a reckless one will label a seller’s statement at all 
without carefully examining such factors as the nature of the defect (was 
it obvious or not) and the buyer’s and seller’s relative knowledge.93  
Simonson and Holbrook, based on a dataset of opinions from 1900 through 1993 
examining whether a communication was a puff or a warranty, confirmed this 
intuition by applying a statistical-regression model.94 They concluded that buyer 
and seller expertise significantly affects courts’ willingness to find a warranty. 
Expert sellers were less likely to successfully argue that their speech was mere 
puffery; conversely, expert buyers faced increased judicial skepticism in 
attempting to assert warranty claims.95 Buyers with opportunities to inspect goods, 
when inspection would have helped to ascertain the goods’ characteristics, were 
less likely to prevail in their warranty claims.96 Purchasers of goods were more 
successful at defeating a puffery defense than purchasers of services.97 Makers of 
new goods had more latitude to puff without sanction than those of established 
products.98 Overall, the content of the speech alone was a poor predictor of its 
immunity. Rather, “the determination of permissibility [had to be] made in 
connection with the situational circumstances of a case.”99 
Independent examination of warranty cases supports Simonson and 
Holbrook’s empirical study. Judges indeed hesitate to find warranties based on 
statements about a product’s general qualities or condition in the absence of 
specific false facts.100 For example, in Guess v. Lorenz, a statement that “the car is 
in good shape” was too general and thus not an express warranty of the car’s 
condition.101 
93. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 336 (4th ed. 1995). 
94. Simonson & Holbrook, supra note 92, at 221 (describing their methodology). Simonson and
Holbrook’s study faces potential selection-bias problems that they discount, which may make their 
results significantly less reliable as a predictor of what courts are actually doing in response to warranty 
claims. See generally Hoffman, supra note 63, at 610–11 (discussing problems of bias in using judicial 
opinions as a proxy for judicial decision making). 




99. Id. at 226. 
100. See Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 521 P.2d 281, 290 (Kan. 1974) (stating that “mere
expressions of opinion, belief, judgment, or estimate by a dealer in sales talk” are not warranties). 
101. 612 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see also Hubbard v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 95 
Civ. 4362, 1996 WL 274018, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that statements describing Suburbans, 
such as “like a rock,” “popular,” and “the most dependable, long-lasting trucks on the planet” do not 
create express warranties because they are generalized and exaggerated claims upon which a consumer 
could not reasonably rely); Web Press Servs. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 525 A.2d 57, 62 
(Conn. 1987) (holding that statements to the effect that a motor vehicle was “excellent” and in “mint” 
condition and that an automobile was in “very good” condition were general and did not rise to the level 
of an express warranty, and were thus examples of puffing); Serbalik v. General Motors Corp., 667 
N.Y.S.2d 503, 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (determining that a statement that an automobile was “of 
high quality” was “nothing more than innocent ‘puffery’”); Scaringe v. Holstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 903, 
904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (finding that the defendant’s statement in an advertisement that a car was in 
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On the other hand, opinions coupled with representations of fact that are 
“susceptible of exact knowledge” do create warranties.102 For example, in 
Wiseman v. Wolfe’s Terre Haute Auto Auction, Inc., the seller’s repeated statement 
that his truck was “road ready” was held to be an express warranty even though the 
seller contended that he had merely expressed his own opinion.103 In so holding, 
the court looked to Kemp v. Mays, which held that a seller’s statement that “there 
is no hog cholera in the country that I know of, and the pigs are all right” amounted 
to an express warranty about hog quality.104 
Despite the supposed objectivity of the warranty test (“reasonable reliance” 
and specific, factually intensive, promises), much of the courts’ analysis is based 
on subjective determinations, such as the plaintiff’s vulnerability.105 
“[J]udgmentally impaired person[s]” are given greater protection, especially where 
speakers have specialized experience and extensive knowledge about their 
products.106 For example, in Roth v. Ray-Stel’s Hair Stylists, Inc., a woman 
received a warranty, and not a puff, when her hair bleaching experience left her 
with “a considerable reduction in the quantity and attractiveness of her hair.”107 
After the hairdresser’s testimony that he had read the box, relied on it, and 
“excellent condition” was “puffery”). In another case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants expressly 
warranted that their bungee cord was “a good, strong, top notch American-made product,” because 
“Made in the USA” and “Premium Quality” labels appeared on the outside of a cord’s package, but that 
the warranty was breached when a rebounding cord hit plaintiff in the eye. Anderson v. Bungee Int’l 
Mfg. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 534, 540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The court determined that the statements on 
the package did not constitute an express warranty because they were not descriptions of particular 
characteristics of the goods. Id. at 541. 
102. Young & Cooper, Inc., 521 P.2d at 290; see also Teter v. Shultz, 39 N.E.2d 802, 804 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1942) (holding that a seller’s statement that dairy cows would give six gallons of milk per day was 
an “affirmation of fact by the seller relating to the goods”); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc., 
209 N.W.2d 643, 654–55 (Neb. 1973) (holding that a statement that a piece of equipment was 
“designed to safely carry working loads up to 20,000 pounds per panel” constituted an express warranty 
because it concerned specific performance capabilities (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
103. Wiseman v. Wolfe’s Terre Haute Auto Auction, Inc., 459 N.E.2d 736, 737–38 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984). 
104. Kemp v. Mays, 127 N.E. 156, 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1920) (noting the rule that “[a] direct and
positive affirmation that an animal is sound amounts to a warranty of soundness”). 
105. See Goldwater v. Ollie’s Garage, No. 357372, 1998 WL 83144, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb.
18, 1998) (stating that “although ‘oral statements by used-car salesmen are notoriously unreliable,’ the 
vulnerability of the buyer is an important factor even in used-car cases” (quoting WHITE & SUMMERS, 
supra note 93, § 9-4, at 488–89); Wedding v. Duncan, 220 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Ky. 1949) (noting that the 
test is “whether the seller assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or whether he merely 
states an opinion or expresses a judgment about a thing as to which they may each be expected to have 
an opinion and exercise a judgment”). 
106. Goldwater, 1998 WL 83144, at *1. 
107. Roth v. Ray-Stel’s Hair Stylists, Inc., 470 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984). The box
contained the following words: “Doesn’t creep or swell. Stay-put consistency. Applies Easily. 
Consistency equal to and in some cases better than competitive bleaches. Gentle Blond does not run or 
creep, swell or puff. Stays where it is put for an easy application.” Id. The hairdresser testified that after 
using the product on plaintiff’s hair, “the product did swell rapidly and that, in doing so, it very quickly 
caused the damage to the hair.” Id. One cannot help but admire the court’s forbearing from making a 
number of obvious jokes about this hair-raising problem. 
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recommended its use to the plaintiff, the court stated that the jury was justified in 
finding that the plaintiff was the type of person that defendant manufacturer “might 
reasonably have expected to . . . be affected by the goods.”108 Courts thus focus on 
the actual bargaining position of both parties: this relational approach provides less 
protection for puffing speech than in the market contexts discussed in the previous 
parts. 
D. THE PUFFERY DEFENSE IN PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CASES
As most students learn in the first-year contracts course, promissory estoppel 
fills the gap between contract and tort law, enforcing promises that contract law 
does not normally countenance.109 Enforcement requires an “actual, clear”110 
promise of sufficient definiteness to induce reasonable reliance.111 The puffery 
defense is a response to both the “promise” and the “reasonable reliance” 
components of the test.112 
As in the warranty context, a statement’s specificity is the jumping-off point 
for most analyses of puffery defenses. Thus, when a truck maker sued a foreign 
steel manufacturer for alleged defects in a new type of steel, the court rejected a 
puffery defense regarding “fact-specific and highly technical” promises, such as 
“[the steel] could be welded without preheating for joints up to 50 mm thick.”113 
More commonly, however, courts dismiss promissory estoppel claims based 
on puffery defenses. For example, a school district told a teacher that there was “no 
problem with her teaching . . . the following year” and “everything looked fine for 
her rehire.” Notwithstanding the teacher’s reliance, the promises were neither 
“sufficiently promissory nor sufficiently definite” to create liability; they were 
puffery.114 
108. Id. at 139; see also Barton v. Am. Dodge, Inc., 194 A.2d 720, 722 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1963)
(finding that the buyer was a “young man with little business experience” relevant to determining the 
existence of a warranty). 
109. The elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) that does in fact induce such 
reliance; (3) the presence of injustice absent enforcement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
90 (1981). 
110. Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
111. Garwood Packaging, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 378 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2004). 
112. See, e.g., All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965)). 
113. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 681 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
114. D’Ulisse-Cupo v. Bd. of Dirs. of Notre Dame High Sch., 520 A.2d 217, 221 (Conn. 1987);
see also Heidi Ott A.G. v. Target Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1076–77 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding that a 
promise to “aggressively promote and advertise” Ott’s dolls was not sufficiently clear and definite 
enough to support a claim of promissory estoppel). Similarly, in Shore v. Motorola Inc., the defendant 
advertised to recruit “best-in-class” experts to contribute articles for publication. The plaintiff produced 
articles according to the defendant’s criteria, but those articles were never approved for publication. The 
court determined that the defendant’s recruitment literature did not establish an express and 
unconditional promise to publish the plaintiff’s works, but rather Motorola’s call for authors “merely 
employed puffery” and stated “aspirations for a novel and grand project” and therefore were not 
promises that could constitute a contract. Shore v. Motorola Inc., No. 98-4227, 2000 WL 51143, at *3 
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Even if the promisee relied on the promise, the promise must be one that the 
promisor should reasonably anticipate will cause the promisee to act or to 
forbear.115 A paradigmatic case is Garwood Packaging, Inc. v. Allen & Co., where 
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, an investment company, told them its 
commitment was unconditional and that the company would salvage plaintiff’s 
failing business “come hell or high water.”116 The court determined that whether 
reliance is reasonable depends upon the “knowledge that the promisee brings to the 
table.”117 Plaintiff “had to know that Martin could not mean literally that the deal 
would go through ‘come hell or high water,’ since if Satan or a tsunami obliterated 
Ohio that would kill the deal.”118 Because the plaintiff was an experienced 
businessman, not “blinded by optimism or desperation,” he could not have 
reasonably understood the defendants’ statements to be serious promises rather 
than mere expressions of optimism.119 
Similarly, in Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., the Michigan Court of 
Appeals found that General Motors’ statement that given “favorable market 
demand,” General Motors would “continue production and maintain continuous 
employment”120 was mere “hyperbole and puffery,”121 not the type of promise on 
which reasonable individuals rely. The court held further that defendant’s 
statements were inconsequential expressions of optimism and hopeful expectations 
to keep a manufacturing plant open, i.e., speech one should “reasonably expect” 
from a company hoping to take advantage of tax abatements, but should not take 
seriously.122 
E. SYNTHESIS OF PUFFERY DOCTRINE
It is not surprising, reading these cases side by side, that some scholars have 
concluded that the puffery defense is a lawless enterprise, a classic example of an 
(7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2000) (stating that “[t]he parties had no prior dealings, and the record contains nothing 
about the customary publication schedule of a world-class encyclopedia of statistical tools”). 
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) (“A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee . . . and which 
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.”). 
116. Garwood Packaging, Inc., 378 F.3d at 704. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id.; see also Chesus v. Watts, 967 S.W.2d 97, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that “[n]one
of the Watts’ promises were speculative of what might happen, nor did the promises require predicting 
events over which he had no control . . . . [n]or could Watts’ promises be deemed as ‘mere puffery’”). 
120. Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis
omitted). 
121. Id. at 559. 
122. Id. The court also noted that many people acknowledged during the public hearings that
General Motors was not making any promises. For example, one man stated: “I have eighteen years in 
and I’d like to see them stay here twelve years so I can retire, but they are not promising anything.” Id. 
at 562. 
PUFFERY11.DOC 4/4/2008 2:47:26 PM 
THE BEST PUFFERY ARTICLE EVER 121 
“I know it when I see it” jurisprudence.123 Moreover, the reader might fairly 
suspect that courts are using the same name (puffery) to describe unique 
conclusions in lawsuits across starkly different legal regimes. After all, what does 
market-wide fraud protection have to do with the individualized inquiry of 
promissory estoppel? What does the sale of securities have to do with the sale of 
trucks, pigs, and hair products? 
On the other hand, legal authorities in all these cases are confronting a similar 
problem. To appreciate the core similarity, it may help to model the problem 
abstractly. Consumer C alleges that she only purchased product or stock X because 
seller S said speech P. Insofar as preferences are stable and self-maximizing, a 
consumer alleging that she acted where she would not have absent speech P is 
claiming that P distorted efficient consumption. 
Now, courts must decide how to evaluate C’s claim of distortion. C’s 
statement is not itself decisive. After all, C may simply regret her choice or may 
misremember the reasons for buying X. Or perhaps S was simply offering an 
opinion about X that implied no facts (either true or false). Liability for P under 
these circumstances would be an unbounded principle, suggesting immediate 
constitutional and economic objections.124 And, even if P itself is false, or implies 
false facts, punishing all false speech would potentially chill true speech. 
In an ideal world, courts would have a sophisticated set of fact-finding 
devices on hand to distinguish actionable from immune speech P.125 Most 
importantly, the court would want a time machine to allow it to travel back to the 
moment that C decided to buy X.126 Once there, the court would run three 
experiments. In the first, the court would apply a probe to C’s mind and determine 
if speech P was a decisive factor in the decision to buy X. Second, the court would 
run a survey of all of the potential hearers of P to determine what facts it conveyed, 
and then determine whether those facts were false. Finally, the court would apply a 
sophisticated lie detector to S, asking if S intended to induce C to purchase X 
under circumstances that a fully informed C would have declined to buy.127 
123. Leighton, supra note 19, at 618 (“Frequently, puffery is defined both by what it is and what it
is not . . . . In some cases, puffery appears to be an I-know-it-when-I-see-it phenomenon to which the 
closest of the many broad definitions of the concept is then applied or extended after the fact to cover 
the claim.”). 
124. I will elaborate on these objections in the next two parts of this Article. 
125. Cf. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 809–10 (1935) (hypothesizing a whimsical “dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press” to aid in 
interpreting obscure texts). 
126. If the machine was a retrofitted 1982 DeLorean DMC-12 sports car, so much the better for the 
court’s self-image. 
127. An analogue to such a testing machine might be an fMRI. An fMRI is a brain-scanning device 
that tracks blood flow throughout the brain as a person performs a certain mental task. Sandra 
Blakeslee, Just What’s Going on Inside That Head of Yours?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2000, at F6. 
Specific regions in the brain light up and are projected onto a screen to show increased blood flow when 
a person is engaged in a particular task, such as decision making, remembering, paying attention, and 
imagining. Id. Unlike MRI scans, which take a snapshot of the brain, fMRI images can capture the brain 
while it is in the process of completing its tasks. Id. Proponents of the fMRI, or “brain fingerprinting,” 
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Sadly, such machines do not exist, or, for those tests for which they do, are 
not available to courts in a world of scarce resources.128 Instead, courts struggle 
with the reality of hindsight judgments, limited resources, and doctrinal constraints 
that make it quite difficult to distinguish lawful “P” from unlawful “P.” In each of 
the areas of law discussed, therefore, courts have taken slightly different 
approaches to determining if consumers have been misled. Such differences relate 
to how the plaintiffs raise claims of deception, and to judicial deference to parties 
with the most relevant expertise about purchase decisions. 
Differences between the securities and false-advertising cases are in part a 
function of the distinct views of the SEC and the FTC. The SEC and the securities 
laws generally have long been concerned about the distorting effects of puffing by 
issuers, and evidence substantial hostility to the defense of puffery.129 As a result, 
courts in securities cases dismiss present-tense puffery most of the time. Courts’ 
willingness to apply this defense with respect to forward-looking statements likely 
stems from their view that rational shareholders never buy based on optimistic 
predictions. By contrast, the FTC has charted the course for the current puffery 
defense in the false-advertising context, notwithstanding a highly critical scholarly 
reception.130 Courts have largely deferred to the agency’s view of puffery, even as 
they have had some trouble applying the FTC’s test in a consistent way. 
Notably, both of these contexts usually consider the aggregate claims of 
thousands or millions of C’s whose behavior was allegedly distorted by the speech 
of one S. Because the claims of each C are not capable of being disaggregated, 
courts usually try to devise rules that apply to the content of the speech itself, 
say that it can detect brain activity that is associated with particular kinds of recollection. For example, 
in an appeal of a murder conviction in Iowa, a brain scan was introduced that suggested that the 
murderer’s brain did not contain information about the murder, but instead contained information 
consistent with his alibi. In this sense, fMRI scanners can be used as a kind of lie detector. Jeffrey 
Rosen, Roberts v. the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 24. Research as to whether 
fMRI scanners can be used to detect lies accurately is still in its early stages, and it is unclear whether 
fMRI scanners will be more accurate than polygraphs. Malcom Ritter, ABC News, Brain Scans May Be 
Used as Lie Detectors, Jan. 29, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ 
wireStory?id=1553625&page=1. 
128. An fMRI scanner, for example, currently costs around $3,000,000, excluding the cost of
operation by a trained expert. See Sean Kevin Thompson, Note, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric 
Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1601, 1608 (2005). Ivan Preston, 
reading this Article in draft, notes that he has presented a survey to the FTC that would in some ways 
replicate the “second experiment” in the text above, but that the FTC has chosen not to use it. See E-
mail from Ivan Preston, Journal Commc’ns Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Wis.–Madison Sch. of 
Journalism & Mass Commc’n, to David Hoffman, Assistant Professor of Law, Temple Univ. Beasley 
Sch. of Law (Apr. 10, 2006) (on file with the Iowa Law Review). 
129. In re George J. Kolar, No. 3-9570, 1999 SEC LEXIS 2300, at *79 n.31 (Oct. 28, 1999)
(stating that the “commission has not generally been hospitable to claims that statements made by a 
registered representative in the course of customer solicitation are ‘mere puffery’” and also that, where 
courts have held that puffery is not actionable fraud, “the Commission considers such cases 
‘extreme’”); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 759 n.4 (discussing the 
history and purpose of the 1933 Act). 
130. See, e.g., PRESTON, supra note 6, at 134–38 (discussing the FTC’s puffery policy). 
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rather than each individual consumption experience. For reasons that I will explore 
in the following two parts, courts consider it unwise to proceed in such aggregate 
investigations by demanding that the parties recreate the three-machine ideal 
suggested earlier in this section. Instead, courts proceed by developing intuitive 
heuristics, which help them distinguish quickly between puffery and 
nonpuffery.131 
Both the UCC and the promissory estoppel applications of puffery similarly 
look to a neutral authority in trying to find the limits of “bad” consumption. For 
courts interpreting the UCC, the words of the Code and its comments focus on 
overweening bargaining power. When S has power over C, then P is likely to be 
seen as part of the reason C consumed (technically, it will be read into the bargain 
as a warranty). In the absence of such power, courts will revert to the analysis of 
the securities and false-advertising cases, looking to the language of the speech 
itself. Notably, this move in the UCC cases does not reflect a different view of 
what constitutes puffing speech, but rather the differing level of specificity which 
courts can bring to the analysis. 
Similarly, in the promissory estoppel context, courts are trying to determine 
which promises mislead consumption. Rather than focusing on bargaining power 
(a function of both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s characteristics), courts focus to a 
great extent on the knowledge “the promisee brings to the table”132: naive 
promisees are protected, while sophisticated promisees are not. When this analysis 
is indeterminate, courts return to the factual/content-based analysis of the market-
wide contexts and display considerable skepticism about the ability of law, rather 
than markets, to protect buyers. In the words of one court, “a healthy skepticism is 
a better protection against being fooled by [sellers] than the costly remedies of the 
law.”133 
I summarize the previous discussion in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: PUFFERY DOCTRINE 
131. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 
EMORY L.J. 83 (2002) (arguing that judges in securities cases use heuristics to distinguish quickly 
between actionable and immune disclosures). 
132. Garwood Packaging, Inc. v. Allen & Co., Inc., 378 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2004). 
133. Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) (considering whether
a statement is actually a promise or whether it belongs “to the realm of puffery, bragging, ‘mere 
words’” (quoting Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995))). 
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This description of current puffery doctrine is valuable because it illustrates 
that courts are not using the same word for a very different set of legal defenses. 
Rather, each application of the defense seeks to distinguish protected speech 
inducing good consumption from unprotected speech inducing bad consumption. 
Differences in how courts accomplish this goal are explained, as explored above, 
as a function of courts’ (1) deference to appropriate expert authorities on the 
rationales for consumption and (2) varying competence in looking at the actual 
purchase decision. In each of the areas depicted in this Part, moreover, we have 
seen that S’s scienter—its awareness that it is intended to take advantage of C’s 
bad decision making—is an important factor in distinguishing actionable speech 
from puffery. 
Now that we have explored this modulated coherence, it is worthwhile to ask: 
why has the doctrine turned out to look like this? That is, we could imagine a 
situation where all self-aggrandizing speech about a product, service, or stock was 
immune, per se. This possibility—similar to early applications of caveat 
emptor134—has not been adopted in any area this Article has explored. 
Alternatively, we could imagine courts refusing any immunity for self-
aggrandizement, instead applying a test that would force speakers to demonstrate 
that their comments did not deceive listeners explicitly or by implication. This 
view also is not the law. 
Instead, the law rests in the middle, and it does so for a number of reasons. 
The next two parts of this Article explore, first, the constitutional, and second, the 
economic policies supporting current puffery doctrine. These two parts inform the 
134. See Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 872 (2005)
( “[H]istorically, parties to a transaction were expected to fend for themselves in the information 
gathering process . . . . [but, i]n recent decades, the law has recognized the injustice and inefficiency 
perpetrated as a result of this approach and has largely abandoned caveat emptor.”). 
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reform agenda that I will introduce in Part V. The goal of that Part is to improve 
current puffery doctrine’s compromised scheme of consumer protection. 
III. CONSTITUTIONALIZING PUFFERY
Because even lying is a form of speech, an obvious question is whether the 
First Amendment requires puffery to be immunized. This section considers the 
problem and demonstrates that puffery’s constitutional aspects throw considerable 
light on the model of “good” purchasing that courts have in mind when they set out 
to analyze claims by allegedly misled buyers. 
Despite recent opportunities,135 the Supreme Court has yet to provide a clear 
explanation of the contours of First Amendment protection for commercial 
speech.136 Such confusion makes conclusions about the constitutional status of 
puffery defenses to public and private litigation somewhat tentative.137 
Nevertheless, this section comprehensively describes aspects of current puffery 
doctrine that might be constitutionally necessary. Given the likelihood that the 
Court will take up these issues again soon, this is a particularly appropriate time to 
consider the possibilities. 
The Court’s commercial-speech movement, beginning in the mid-1970s, 
suggested some bounds on government regulation of speech that proposes 
commercial transactions.138 The Court reasoned that commercial-speech 
protections encourage the “indispensable” nature of the “free flow of commercial 
135. See generally, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 
(2003), and cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654, 665 (2003) (“[T]he Court has wisely decided not to address 
the constitutional questions presented by the certiorari petition at this stage of the litigation.”) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
136. See, e.g., Elliott L. Dozier, Case Note, Kasky v. Nike: The Effect of the Commercial Speech 
Classification on Corporate Statements, 33 STETSON L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2004) (stating that speech 
often has both commercial and noncommercial elements, and “the United States Supreme Court’s 
current definitions for commercial speech do not account for the potential problems of mixed speech”); 
William Warner Eldridge, IV, Case Note, Just Do It: Kasky v. Nike, Inc. Illustrates That It Is Time to 
Abandon the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 179, 180–81 (2003) (arguing that 
the United States Supreme Court should abandon the commercial-speech distinction); Brian J. Waters, 
Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central 
Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1630 (1997) (examining the 
commercial-speech doctrine and suggesting a different approach). 
137. See Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over Corporate Speech and the 
First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1277, 1279 n.12 (2004) (noting that the prevailing 
commercial-speech tests do not speak to puffery, but it is “often dismissed as outside the ambit of 
‘falsity’ of the sort that constitutes false advertising”); see also Charles Gardner Geyh, The Regulation 
of Speech Incident to the Sale or Promotion of Goods and Services: A Multifactor Approach, 52 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1, 24 n.67 (1990) (arguing that “the government has tended not to take action against the 
expression of opinion in the commercial arena, for reasons independent of, though not entirely 
unrelated to, concerns underlying the first amendment”). 
138. See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
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information,”139 but limited this “new protection” to speech that is not 
misleading.140 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York,141 the Court created a more detailed framework for regulation. The 
Court held that the “First Amendment . . . protects commercial speech from 
unwarranted governmental regulation.”142 However, the Court was quick to note 
that its recent decisions distinguished “speech proposing a commercial 
transaction”143 from other “varieties of speech . . . [not] traditionally subject to 
government regulation.”144 Thus, the Court held that commercial speech is less 
protected by the First Amendment than other types of “constitutionally 
guaranteed” expression.145 
Then the Central Hudson Court, focusing on the “informational function of 
advertising” and the requirement of accuracy within commercial transactions, 
announced that the State may prevent any form of commercial speech that is “more 
likely to deceive . . . than to inform . . . .”146 The Court held that for the State to 
restrict nondeceptive commercial speech lawfully, however, it must set forth a 
“substantial interest”147 supporting the regulation, and the restrictions must be 
“‘narrowly drawn’” to that interest.148 
Central Hudson’s progeny have not substantially clarified commercial-speech 
doctrine.149 Most commentators agree that current doctrine does not protect false 
or misleading speech under Central Hudson’s heightened (but still not fully 
fledged) scrutiny.150 However, at least three of the current Justices appear to 
139. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 765. 
140. Id. at 771. 
141. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
142. Id. at 561. 
143. Id. at 562. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 562–63. 
146. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. For more on the informational function of advertising, see
infra Part IV. Some of this early jurisprudence can be traced to an early, oft-cited, Article by Professor 
Redish. See generally Martin Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech 
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971). 
147. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
148. Id. at 565 (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978)). 
149. See Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick It Up a Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial
Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205, 1206–07 (2004) (arguing that the Court’s “inconsistent 
approach” to commercial-speech-doctrine cases “has led to confusion in the lower courts”); Robert 
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (finding the 
doctrine “unstable and contentious”). Justice Breyer, in a recent dissent from a denial of certiorari, 
forecast his sympathy with expanded commercial-speech protections: “In my view . . . the questions 
presented directly concern the freedoms of Americans to speak about public matters in public debate . . 
.  and delay itself may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of free speech without 
making the issue significantly easier to decide later on.” Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 667 (2003) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
150. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1776 n.49 (2004) (suggesting that 
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support eliminating any exception for misleading speech, providing it with a 
significantly higher level of First Amendment protection.151 
Insofar as current doctrine suggests constitutional problems with government 
regulations concerning nonmisleading commercial speech,152 we confront a key 
definitional question: what does the Court mean by misleading speech? 
The answer to that question is unknown. The Court’s current commercial-
speech jurisprudence is confused as to why speech with the latent possibility of 
being false—misleading speech—should receive “less” constitutional protection 
than fully truthful speech.153 In the political arena, the Court has often stated that 
“there is no such thing as a false idea,”154 but in the commercial context, it finds 
that misleading speech—that is, speech that only implies falsehoods to some 
potential audience members—somehow pollutes the goals that constitutional 
speech protections ought to serve. 
Robert Post, in an important recent Article, suggests three different accounts 
of why misleading speech is subject to regulation.155 A narrow view limits 
“misleading” speech to contexts where speakers have the power, by virtue of their 
special, often one-on-one, relationships with listeners, to overwhelm rational 
relations.156 Let us call this the “relationship approach” to distorted consumption. 
A second view—which appeals most to the Court—focuses on the content of 
the speech itself.157 Let us call this the “content approach” to distorted 
consumption. Where speech is potentially misleading based on the words used, it is 
“misleading commercial advertisements are akin to legally obscene materials in that they are regulable 
under minimal rational basis scrutiny without regard to First Amendment standards or values”); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 152 (summarizing the interplay between Central Hudson and Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council). 
151. Sullivan, supra note 150, at 153–55 (discussing the views of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and
Ginsburg). 
152. See Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136,
137 (1994) (finding that it was not misleading for an attorney, who was also a certified public 
accountant and certified financial planner, to place CFP and CPA next to her name in her yellow-pages 
advertisement (under “Attorneys”) and also on her business card); Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism 
Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340–41 (1986) (finding that advertising of a casino was “not misleading or 
fraudulent”); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 186 (1985) (finding “no contention that any of the 
information published in the advisory services had been false or materially misleading”); In re R.M.J., 
455 U.S. 191, 205 (1982) (noting that the parties did not argue over whether the published listing was 
misleading); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1979) (finding an optometrists’ use of a trade 
name to be misleading); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 372 (1977) (finding that an 
attorney’s advertisement was not misleading). 
153. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 645 (1985) (bemoaning
“exceedingly complex and technical factual issues and the consideration of nice questions of 
semantics”). 
154. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
155. See Post, supra note 149, at 36 (discussing the relationship between Meiklejohn’s political
theory of commercial-speech protection and a market-efficiency-based theory). 
156. Id. at 38.
157. Id. at 38–39.
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subject to regulation even in the absence of evidence that any one speaker has 
actually believed facts which were untrue.158 This view of speech imagines 
consumers as highly manipulable, lacking sophistication, and, most significantly, 
unable to self-correct advertisers’ misleading claims.159 
A third approach the Court sometimes uses is more contextual, focusing 
instead “on the specific conditions that might be understood to render consumers 
dependent and vulnerable.”160 Call this the “content plus context” view of 
distorted consumption. This account of consumption has some obvious advantages 
over the preceding two alternatives.161 It is better than the relationship approach 
because it recognizes that distortion is possible outside the individualized context 
of one buyer and one seller; certain markets, even at a structural level, can allocate 
goods in suboptimal ways. It is also better than the content approach because it 
does not assume that all participants in a market act in the same way. 
A recent Supreme Court case provides a preview of what the content-plus-
context approach looks like in practice. In California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., the 
Court considered a prohibition on puffery by a private dental organization in the 
context of an antitrust suit.162 The Court’s majority opinion suggested that 
unverifiable claims by professionals would likely be trusted by consumers.163 
Thus, a ban on “puffery” could be “pro-competitive” by improving consumer 
decision making and facilitating the success of superior services.164 
California Dental’s perspective on puffery hints that the content-plus-context 
approach might permit the regulation of vague and optimistic speech (puffery) 
when consumers would reasonably be expected to rely on it, and the opinion 
further suggests that advertising by professionals was one such context. However, 
the majority did not go as far as to say that all restrictions on puffery would be pro-
competitive—only those that limit puffery particularly likely to mislead.165 Indeed, 
158. Sullivan, supra note 150, at 153 (discussing the relationship between this view of speech and
the continued viability of the consumer-protective administrative state). 
159. Id. at 156. 
160. Post, supra note 149, at 41 (emphasis added). 
161. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Too Much Puff: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial
Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1228 (1988) (discussing the difference between informative and 
persuasive advertising, and concluding that “the more the speech being restricted is ‘informational’ in 
the sense of facilitating rational consumer choice, the more likely that the Court will strike down the 
restriction”). 
162. 526 U.S. 756, 778 (1999). 
163. Justice Souter’s opinion is not entirely clear on this point, and in general the majority’s
opinion has met with severe criticism. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a 
Quick Look But Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 504 (2000) (describing the opinion as an 
“enigma”); Salil Kumar Mehra, Information in an Antitrust Age, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 224 
(discussing the difficulty in judicial evaluation of the competitive benefits of puffing speech); Timothy 
J. Muris, California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission: The Revenge of Footnote 17, 8
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 265, 286–88 (2000) (summarizing the interplay between professional advertising
and free-speech cases). 
164. California Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 778. 
165. Several have questioned the Court’s hostility toward puffery in California Dental Ass’n and
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the Court explicitly reserved the question of whether puffing speech would be 
entitled to First Amendment protection from government interference.166 
The Court’s development of the meaning of “misleading” thus might proceed 
in dramatically different ways. Because “puffery” is a paradigmatic example of 
potentially misleading speech, its constitutional status depends, a great deal, on 
further doctrinal developments in the commercial-speech context. Taking Post’s 
three alternatives as a guide,167 what are the range of possible outcomes? 
As I have shown, promissory estoppel and warranty promissory estoppel 
defenses regulate only speech that misleads through direct and sustained pressure 
by buyers on sellers. Thus, in those contexts, regulation of puffery is likely not 
vulnerable to challenge under any of the approaches to the constitutional status of 
misleading speech Post identifies. Only if judicial regulation of misleading but 
nonfalse speech were entirely prohibited would warranty and promissory estoppel 
versions of puffery face pressure. This doctrinal change is unlikely, 
notwithstanding the views of three members of the Court,168 because applying 
robust free-speech protections to common-law fraud and contract cases would 
unsettle a great deal of existing law.169 
The false-advertising cases follow the content approach to distorted 
consumption. They address the rights of a single speaker and assume the existence 
of a rational and homogenous market of buyers. The speaker is liable whenever her 
speech has the potential to mislead her audience, which is easy to do insofar as 
buyers are credulous and unsophisticated. Moreover, buyers are unable to research 
for themselves and distinguish true from false speech.170 
Nonetheless, puffery survives as a protected form of speech because the FTC 
has made an administrative decision that buyers—no matter how naive—do not 
rely upon it. We can see this assumption most clearly in recent Lanham Act 
litigation dealing with consumer confusion. In defining the meaning of a litigant’s 
statement that it made “‘Americans’ Favorite Pasta,’” the Eighth Circuit rejected 
the use of a survey to determine if “‘Americans’ Favorite Pasta’” implied false 
facts to a subset of consumers.171 A competitor’s survey had found that a 
questioned why, “[i]f no reasonable consumer would rely on the claims,” is it possible that a “ban on 
such claims be pro-competitive?” Muris, supra note 163, at 292 n.164. This view of reliance tracks 
more obviously with the “ignorant consumers” view of reliance discussed in the text above. 
166. California Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 778 n.14. 
167. See Post, supra note 149, at 25 (introducing the three rules of commercial speech). 
168. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (citing descriptions of the opinions of Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsberg). 
169. Post, for example, doubts that ordinary common-law regulation of speech could create
commercial-speech problems. Post, supra note 149, at 21. Nevertheless, the Court has previously found 
that state enforcement of promissory estoppel obligation against certain speakers raises First 
Amendment issues. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (holding that the 
obligation “is enough to constitute ‘state action’ for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment”). But 
cf. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164–66 (1978) (upholding a warehouse’s sale of goods 
under the Uniform Commercial Code for lack of state action). 
170. This view seems particularly dated in the age of Google. 
171. See Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 391, 393–94 (8th Cir. 2004)
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substantial minority of consumers understood “favorite pasta” to mean “the 
number one brand” or at least a “national brand.”172 Neither implication was 
correct. The Eighth Circuit, however, upheld a puffery defense, noting that the 
dictionary’s definition of “favorite” was not falsifiable, being instead just the type 
of vague claim that ordinarily the FTC would consider immune from regulation.173 
Permitting litigants to transform such vague claims into falsifiable claims through 
use of surveys would be contrary to public policy: 
A manufacturer or advertiser who expended significant resources to 
substantiate a statement or forge a puffing statement could be blind-sided 
by a consumer survey that defines the advertising statement differently, 
subjecting the advertiser or manufacturer to unintended liability for a 
wholly unanticipated claim the advertisement’s plain language would not 
support. The resulting unpredictability could chill commercial speech, 
eliminating useful claims from packaging and advertisements. . . . [T]he 
Lanham Act protects against misleading and false statements of fact, not 
misunderstood statements.174 
This approach, which mixes a concern for overbroad regulation with a narrow 
focus on what was actually said, is a classic application of the FTC’s puffery 
policy.175 More importantly, the Eighth Circuit clearly hinted that regulation of 
puffery entails First Amendment problems. 
Securities-law cases are harder to categorize.176 The model of misleading 
speech they appear most closely to track is the content-plus-context approach, 
looking to a combination of the content (tense, vagueness) and its context (other 
comments by the disclosing entity as a measure of scienter, etc.) Thus, were the 
Court to adopt the relationship approach, requiring a direct relationship between 
buyers and sellers to dispel First Amendment protection, securities defendants 
would win more puffery defenses. Courts would hold that the market ought to 
correct reliance on non-factual, though potentially misleading speech, and that the 
Constitution itself prohibits the SEC from regulating vague statements of optimism 
that mislead buyers. 
(noting that use of the surveys “would reduce ads and packaging to puffery”). 
172. Id. at 393. 
173. Id. at 391–92. 
174. Id. at 393–94 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added). 
175. See, e.g., Leighton, supra note 19, at 631–32 (discussing the problems of the dictionary
approach and arguing that many jurists misread the purpose of the Lanham Act). 
176. It is not entirely clear what type of First Amendment framework to apply to the securities-
disclosure regime. For a general discussion of some of these problems, see NICHOLAS WOLFSON, 
CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC 122–54 (1990). See generally Antony Page & 
Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2005) (articulating constitutional problems with SEC regulations that mandate certain 
types of truthful speech and arguing that “the SEC is normally concerned with whether information is 
false and misleading”). Cf. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 n.9 (1988) (suggesting 
that SEC regulation involved commercial-speech problems); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 234 (1985) 
(White, J., concurring) (avoiding the question of whether the SEC regulates “commercial” speech). 
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The preceding discussion illustrates that the constitutional status of current 
approaches to puffery is contested and depends on a yet-to-be-articulated theory of 
when commercial speech misleads. If the Court adopts a stricter test for misleading 
speech, e.g., the relationship approach, the current false advertising and securities 
treatment of puffery would likely be found unconstitutional. Similarly, were the 
Court to adopt the content-plus-context approach, the FTC might have to start 
examining puffery on an advertisement-by-advertisement basis, instead of 
adopting prophylactic rules. California Dental suggests that the Court is not averse 
to applying the content-plus-context approach, and therefore current FTC views on 
puffery are vulnerable. 
The basic questions in play are: (1) whether the Court will continue to find an 
exception in First Amendment protection for misleading commercial speech; and 
(2) if not, what is the constitutional definition of “misleading”? The Court clearly 
wishes to expand First Amendment protections for commercial speech generally. 
However, it has struggled to find a limit to its quest, and the current stopping place 
it has settled on—”misleading” speech may be banned—is itself ambiguous. That 
ambiguity in turn is a result of the Court’s inability to articulate and defend any 
particular model of “bad” consumption. If we do no’t know what the law ought to 
discourage, and if the First Amendment in the commercial context is tied to 
notions of economically efficient consumption, then it is no surprise that the 
doctrine is confused.
Thus, we need a realistic account of the relationship between puffing speech 
and consumption. The next Part takes on that challenge. 
IV. HOW DO CONSUMERS RESPOND TO PUFFERY?
The constitutional status of puffery, as Part III demonstrated, is tied to courts’ 
shifting understanding of how consumption works. The Supreme Court and other 
legal authorities wish to encourage speech leading to “good” consumption and 
discourage speech leading to “bad” consumption, and they believe that the First 
Amendment’s speech-protecting role might essentially be consistent with that goal. 
Current doctrine depends, to a great degree, on intuitions about the law’s 
ability to promote and to discourage commercial speech. Thus, jurists assume that 
if they were to prohibit puffery because puffery distorts consumption, then their 
intervention would be effective. This ’Part’s goal is, in part, to consider the realism 
of this assumption, utilizing traditional and heterodox economic approaches. 
In Section A, I show why economists believe that prohibitions on puffery and 
other forms of misleading speech will be ineffectual at best and possibly self-
defeating. Section B continues the analysis by relaxing traditional assumptions 
about consumer rationality and discussing how evidence of optimism strengthens 
the case for immunizing puffing speech. These analyses together suggest that both 
the First Amendment analysis discussed in Part III and the existing puffery 
landscape detailed in Part II overestimate the law’s ability to change consumption 
behavior. 
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But, as I demonstrate in Section C of this Part, these highly stylized 
approaches do not realistically take into account evidence of consumers’ actual 
reactions to puffing speech. Rather than ignoring and disbelieving puffing speech, 
consumers believe it and use it to make their purchase decisions. Evidence 
collected from the marketing and behavioral-psychology literature together 
highlight the need for a reform agenda that would better tie doctrine to actual 
evidence of consumer behavior. 
A. EXPLANATIONS ASSUMING RATIONAL BUYERS AND SELLERS
The economic approach to puffery begins by identifying it as a type of 
“persuasive” selling speech. Persuasive speech is economic jargon for speech that 
achieves its consumption-inciting effect not through the conveyance of facts but 
instead “through an emotional appeal or in some similar way.”177 Early economic 
analyses, based on the rational-actor model,178 disapproved of such emotional 
appeals, as economists could not explain (1) why buyers would react to sales 
pitches lacking obvious informational content and (2) why sellers would purchase 
such advertising.179 
Economists’ later work attempted to rescue puffing speech from claims that it 
was waste.180 They argued that persuasive sales talk could aid consumers to 
177. R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, in ADVERTISING AND FREE SPEECH, PROCEEDINGS 
OF A LIBERTY FUND CONFERENCE ON “ADVERTISING VS. FREE SPEECH: DILEMMA OR INVENTION” 1, 8 
(Allen Hyman & M. Bruce Johnson eds., 1977) [hereinafter ADVERTISING AND FREE SPEECH]; see also 
Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 
VOLUME 3, 9–16 (Armstrong & Porter eds., forthcoming), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~kwb8/adchapterPost082605.pdf (describing the history of the economic 
approach to persuasive advertising). 
178. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1551, 1551 (1998) (analogizing rational persons to rats, which “are at least as rational as human 
beings when rationality is defined as achieving one’s ends . . . at least cost”). Another way of describing 
the expected-utility theory is to note its four principal decision-making principles: ordering (people 
“must either prefer one [object to another] or be indifferent to both”); continuity (“if the odds are right, 
a person will always gamble”); independence (“[a] person’s preferences between two objects should 
remain unchanged when the objects are substituted into identical lotteries”); and invariance (individuals 
should express the same preferences when different descriptions of the same outcome are presented). 
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market 
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 641–42 (1999). For a discussion of the “rationality debate” 
among current practitioners of law and economics, see David A. Hoffman, Punitive Damages: How 
Relevant is Jury Rationality?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 509–11 (book review). 
179. See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad, 
108 QUART. J. ECON. 941, 956 (1993) (citing sources). 
180. An important example of such work, by Klein and Leffler, explained the mechanism by 
which consumers would seek to pay for brand protections to avoid harms caused by “difficult-to-
measure” contractual-performance obligations. See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of 
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (describing 
indirection-information theory of advertising). An early empirical work that influenced legal perception 
of advertising found that states with constrained advertising regimes had higher eyeglass prices than 
states that permitted advertising. See Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 
4 J.L. & ECON. 337, 352 (1972) (finding that prices for eyeglasses in states without restrictions were 
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cultivate tastes for “cleanliness and beauty”181 and might encourage the act of 
consumption. These taste-shaping and inciting aspects of persuasion in turn would 
lead consumers to experience product facts for themselves. But these advantages 
paled before persuasive speech’s (particularly, advertising’s) ability to inform 
consumers through brands.182 
Brand theory posits that consumers benefit through strong brands in part 
because they reduce search costs.183 Ambler and Hollier expressed the idea in 
vivid terms: “[J]ust as female peacocks are drawn to mates with the largest, most 
spectacular tail feathers because the display signals superior biological fitness, 
consumers are attracted to brands that invest in lavish displays like Superbowl 
commercials because such extravagance signals a high-quality, successful 
brand.”184 
Speakers that create robust brands encourage buyers to spend less money 
investigating subsidiary characteristics.185 Strong brands help consumers by 
offering them assurances that the good they are buying will fulfill expectations; 
thus, there should be a correlation “between advertising intensity and the extent of 
quality that is costly to determine prepurchase.”186 That is, the more it costs 
“substantially lower” than prices in states with restrictions). 
181. Coase, supra note 177, at 10 (internal comma omitted). For a useful modern-literature review 
on the taste-changing aspect of advertising, see Yoav Hammer, Expressions Which Preclude Rational 
Processing: The Case for Regulating Non-Informational Advertisements, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 435, 
447 (2005). 
182. Phillip Nelson, Comments on Advertising and Free Speech, in ADVERTISING AND FREE 
SPEECH, supra note 177, at 52. The creation and diffusion of brands was arguably necessary to the 
formation of modern market economies, even though the meaning of “brand” itself is contested. See 
generally Thomas C. O’Guinn & Albert M. Muñiz Jr., Communal Consumption and the Brand, in 
INSIDE CONSUMPTION: CONSUMER MOTIVES, GOALS AND DESIRES 252 (S. Ratneshwar & David Glen 
Mick eds., 2005) [hereinafter INSIDE CONSUMPTION] (discussing identification of consumers into 
communities through brand loyalty). 
183. See Nelson, supra note 182, at 52–53. See generally Phillip Nelson, Advertising as 
Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. 
POL. ECON. 311 (1970). 
184. Tim Ambler & E. Ann Hollier, The Waste in Advertising is the Part that Works, 44 J. ADVER. 
RES. 375, 382 (2004). In one experiment, Ambler and Hollier showed consumers commercials that had 
identical scripts but different production values (some had been degraded visually or aurally). 
Advertisements that were perceived to cost more were significantly more persuasive to consumers in 
their purchase decisions. Id. at 379–81; see also Perry Haan & Cal Berkey, A Study of the Believability 
of the Forms of Puffery, 8 J. MKTG. COMM. 243, 253 (2002) (finding that puffing signals the 
competitive strength of the product); cf. Press Release, FKF Applied Research, Superbowl XL Ad Rank 
(Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.fkfadrank.com/index.asp? 
Type=B_ BASIC&SEC={D1C9ABB0-20AA-432D-8058-4F896C7FD38A} (ranking Super Bowl ads 
based on fMRI technology). 
185. For example, a seller with a strong brand might also be trusted to have a good record in 
delivering the right goods on time or to be trusted not to insist on terms in adhesion contracts. 
186. Klein & Leffler, supra note 180, at 631; see Bagwell, supra note 177, at 19–20 (summarizing 
empirical literature on correlation). 
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consumers to identify good quality (and thus, the harder it is to differentially price 
goods), the more valuable puffery theoretically would be.187 
But, because such subsidiary characteristics may be hard to detect before 
purchase, persuasive advertising might help sellers create false stories about 
product traits that consumers are unlikely to be able to dispel. That is, puffery 
might convince consumers to buy when they would not otherwise do so, because 
consumers believe that puffed goods do not need further investigation.188 
To use the peacock example, imagine an enterprising, large, clever, and 
dexterous pigeon painting its drab feathers a vivid hue. The economic analysis 
discussed thus far explains why consumers might be deceived and think that the 
pigeon really was a peacock, as search costs discourage further investigation. Upon 
buying the pigeon, consumers will obviously experience some degree of 
frustration.189 This argument would suggest that regulation of puffing speech will 
lead to improved decision making and utility. 
Scholars have challenged this pro-regulatory conclusion. Economists assert 
that in the absence of regulation, market forces will themselves prevent puffery. 
Over time, through repeated disappointing experiences with hyped goods, 
consumers will come to disbelieve puffery.190 Puffing sellers will develop a brand 
reputation for dishonesty, helped along by competitors with incentives to expose 
those lies that are not readily available to consumers.191 Thus, in the absence of 
regulation, puffery that fails to maximize consumer welfare should disappear. 
When regulation is introduced, economists assume that consumers will 
(mistakenly) believe that government-run anti-fraud regimes are perfectly 
enforced.192 This belief is false on at least two levels. First, and most obviously, in 
a world of limited resources and practically limited fines, the expected costs of 
fraud are almost never going to equal the expected benefits. Additionally, the 
market for advertising is heterogeneous. Thus, protections against fraud on a 
market-wide basis, unlike common-law protections involving one-on-one 
persuasion, will inevitably be directed only at segments of the audience. To the 
extent the costs of protection permit advertisers to disclose only a limited universe 
187. The evidence of the relationship between persuasive advertising and good quality is mixed.
See Bagwell, supra note 177, at 51–54 (suggesting a relationship between direct product-quality claims 
and product quality, but no general “strong support for a hypothesis of a systematic positive relationship 
between advertising and product quality”). 
188. In markets with repeat purchases, as Klein and Leffler explain, puffing speech may help to
insure against this very problem. Klein & Leffler, supra note 180, at 616 (discussing assumption of 
repeat purchasing). That is, consumers will use puffing speech as an important nonprice guarantee of 
quality, subject to verification through repeated purchases. 
189. The degree of frustration obviously depends on the point of the purchase. A clever pigeon is
not so easy to find. 
190. RICHARD POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC 5 (1973). Posner further
argued that rising education levels “have probably reduced the credulity of the average consumer.” Id. 
191. Although, as Posner argued, there will be circumstances where it will not benefit competitors
to expose fraud due to, for example, transaction costs, and there will be further circumstances where 
group lying will benefit the business. Id. at 6. 
192. Nelson, supra note 182, at 54–55. 
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of information, all advertising regulation will, in a sense, shift misleading speech 
burdens from one segment of the audience to another.193 
Consumers thus will overestimate the protection offered by regulatory 
protection from puffing fraud. As Richard Parmentier explained, puffery 
traditionally advances a “second-level message: ‘take this as a puff.’” If listeners 
are skeptical, which rational buyers will be in a caveat emptor legal regime, the 
“metamessage at least partially guarantees that consumers will properly” 
comprehend the metamessage and avoid reliance.194 However, when authorities 
work to increase protections from fraud, consumers feel a “false confidence,”195 
their defenses to puffery are reduced, and advertisers are encouraged to puff at 
greater rates.196 
Why? Because economists assume that sellers (unlike buyers) will have an 
accurate perception of the relationship between regulation and the expected legal 
costs of puffery. This assumption rests on an unarticulated belief that (1) sellers 
know when they are puffing and when they are not and (2) sellers subject to 
regulation are better positioned to understand its nature than buyers protected by it. 
As a result of these factors, economists conclude that regulation of puffery 
and other forms of persuasive commercial speech is inevitably self-defeating.197 
B. EXPLANATIONS ASSUMING EMOTIONAL BUYERS AND SELLERS
The economic analysis of the meaning and utility of puffery is also informed 
by recent work on human behavior.198 That work too can be read to suggest that 
regulation of puffing speech will be ineffectual, because both speakers and 
193. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 406 (5th ed. 1998). 
194. RICHARD J. PARMENTIER, SIGNS IN SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SEMIOTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 144–45
(1994). 
195. Id. at 154. 
196. Id. at 151. 
197. On its own terms, the claim is questionable. Imagine at time T0, there is no enforcement
regime against any false advertising. Under such circumstances, a consumer would only become aware 
of fraud in two ways: personal experience with nonconforming goods and informal gossip networks. 
Because consumers are distributed widely and there are barriers to transmission of information about 
erroneous choices, consumer knowledge of fraud would presumably be quite low, and a significant 
number of sales will occur that would not otherwise take place. Now imagine that the FTC announces a 
new anti-fraud regime, whereby all “deceptive” speech will be regulated. Accompanying this 
announcement is a press release noting important and recent vivid examples of fraud. At this time, T1, 
consumers thus will be highly alert to the possibility of fraud in purchasing, not less alert, as Coase’s 
analysis would suggest. As a result, consumers will increase their “metapragmatic defenses” to puffery 
and other forms of sales talk. Now, as that initial effect fades, it is possible (at time T2) that the 
cognitive laziness born of living in a regulated market may create a net result of more misled purchases, 
but that intuition is untested. It would depend on the FTC’s continued willingness to publicize its 
successful prosecutions (which, admittedly, they are likely to do). To know more about consumer 
vulnerability, we probably would want to establish a formula that analyzed the relationship between 
consumer care, regulatory publicity, and seller behavior. Needless to say, such a formula is not extant. 
See Craswell, supra note 6, at 695–96 (discussing the relationship between law and consumer belief). 
198. See Hoffman, supra note 63, at 546–48 (discussing common assumptions and critiques of 
behavioral law and economics). 
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listeners are excessively optimistic. Because of such congenital overoptimism, 
legal regimes that do not immunize puffery may have little to no effect on 
consumption-distorting behavior. 
Experiments detailed in the behavioral literature demonstrate a consistent 
“overconfidence bias,” which encourages us to think that “good things are more 
likely than average to happen to [our property] and bad things are less likely than 
average to happen to [it].”199 Although “the study of hope in the literature in 
marketing and psychology is limited,”200evidence for this bias is wide-ranging and 
is especially significant when individuals are motivated to want good outcomes.201 
Although overoptimism is often discussed as a byproduct of other flaws in 
human-probability decision making,202 this is probably itself a misconception. In 
an early study, Shelley Taylor and Jonathon Brown suggested that optimistic 
thinking makes us, in a sense, better people.203 Unrealistic optimism is correlated 
with reported happiness,204 decreased loneliness,205 productivity,206 and pro-
social behavior.207 
Optimism increases the amount of puffery on both supply and demand fronts. 
On the “supply side,” optimism leads individuals to actually believe in their wrong 
estimations of future success. Individuals are less able to remember facts that 
suggest failure than facts that promise success.208 Skills that we lack are dismissed 
as common and unimportant; skills that we perceive ourselves to have are relished 
as unique and crucial to the task at hand.209 Sellers experience the “future . . . [as] 
great, especially for [them].”210 
199. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091 (2000); see Christine 
Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 270–71 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005) (discussing bias 
generally); Gustavo E. de Mello & Deborah J. MacInnis, Why and How Consumers Hope: Motivated 
Reasoning and the Marketplace, in INSIDE CONSUMPTION, supra note 182, at 44, 54–55 (collecting 
studies and connecting hope to optimism bias). 
200. Mello & MacInnis, supra note 199, at 44. 
201. There is a correlation between imagining positive future outcomes and the perceived
likelihood of that outcome. Id. at 55. 
202. See generally Aaron J. Wright, Note, Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral Economics and the
Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183 (2005) (arguing that cognitive biases such as 
overoptimism shape the method by which a person assesses future events). 
203. See generally Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social
Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCH. BULL. 193 (1988). 
204. Id. at 198 (noting that evidence of association is “largely correlational rather than causal”). 
205. Carolyn E. Cutrona, Transition to College: Loneliness and the Process of Social Adjustment,
in LONELINESS: A SOURCEBOOK OF CURRENT THEORY, RESEARCH AND THERAPY 291, 304–05 (Letitia 
Anne Peplau & Daniel Perlman eds., 1982). 
206. See Taylor & Brown, supra note 203, at 203–04 (citing studies). 
207. See id. at 203 (citing studies). 
208. See generally Irwin Silverman, Self-Esteem and Differential Responsiveness to Success and
Failure, 69 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 115 (1964). 
209. See, e.g., Taylor & Brown, supra note 203, at 196 (citing studies). 
210. Id. at 200. 
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Similarly, on the demand side, “factories make products, which in the stores 
are sold as hope.”211 The marketplace is full of products with low efficacy and 
high cost,212 but which nevertheless sell well.213 Overoptimism may lead 
consumers to “overlook or ignore the dangers” involved in risky goods, and 
maintain false hope about their ability to perceive and avoid those very risks.214 
Thus, when courts say that “people in charge of an enterprise are not required 
to take a gloomy, fearful or defeatist view of the future,”215 they may implicitly be 
making a policy case for puffery based on a lay understanding of the optimism 
bias. For instance, an early court concluded that “[e]xaggeration, puffing [and] 
boasting appear to be the very breath of salesmanship. We never expect detraction, 
always over emphasis.”216 Permitting puffery recognizes that seller compliance 
with any legal sanction of optimism is likely to be low, in part because individuals 
do not understand or know the law, but also because they do not actually think they 
are misleading anyone. Some sellers puff because they believe that they really are 
the best. Similarly, some buyers would be disappointed if puffing speech 
disappeared from commercial transactions, because part of what purchasers expect 
to buy is hope itself. 
The relationship between optimism theory and puffery is supported by the 
work of marketers who examined the reaction of consumers to advertisements that 
puffed goods that did not actually live up to their sales talk. In one experiment, 
scholars found that overstatement (i.e., puffery) of product characteristics produces 
less negative later evaluations of the product than either realistic or negative 
evaluations of the product.217 Another study examined the impact of so-called 
“two sided” claims; where advertisers mix puffing claims about product attributes 
that matter to consumers with pessimistic and inculpatory claims about product 
attributes of less importance. Consumers liked a degree of puffery—it increased 
their perception of advertising truthfulness.218 When puffed to “an extreme 
degree,” however, consumers were unhappy after using the product.219 
211. Mello & MacInnis, supra note 199, at 49; see Theodore Levitt, The Morality (?) of
Advertising, HARV. BUS. REV., July/Aug. 1970, at 85 (paraphrasing Charles Revson: “In the factory, we 
make cosmetics; in the store we sell hope.”). 
212. Hair-loss cures are a classic example. Diet pills, as the discussion in Part II illustrates, is
another commonly litigated dispute involving hope in a bottle. Optimism and hope often trump reality: 
few of us will end up thin and with a full head of hair. 
213. The alternative-medicine market is said to approach $18 billion in sales yearly. Mello &
MacInnis, supra note 199, at 50. 
214. Id. at 61–62 (collecting studies). 
215. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1129–30 (2d Cir. 1994) (“People in charge
of an enterprise are not required to take a gloomy, fearful or defeatist view of the future; subject to what 
current data indicates, they can be expected to be confident about their stewardship and the prospects of 
the business that they manage.”). A search of the “ALLCASES” database on Westlaw found seventeen 
citations to this formulation of the right to be optimistic, mostly in the Second Circuit. 
216. Union Car Adver. Co. v. Collier,  189 N.E. 463, 468 (N.Y. 1934). 
217. See Richard W. Olshavsky & John A. Miller, Consumer Expectations, Product Performance,
and Perceived Product Quality, 9 J. MKT. RES. 19, 20 (1972). 
218. See Michael A. Kamins & Lawrence J. Marks, Advertising Puffery: The Impact of Using
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This evidence confirms that puffing speech benefits consumers and that the 
benefits ought to be included in any analysis of efficient puffery doctrine. 
Obviously, without a complete theory of when optimism generates happiness and 
when it does not, the weight we should assign to puffery’s psychic value remains 
unknown. 
C. SOME EVIDENCE OF CONSUMERS’ EXPERIENCES WITH PUFFERY
The preceding two sections offered alternative model views of how 
consumers experience puffing speech. Economists assuming rationality conclude 
that misleading commercial talk will build economically useful brands, will help 
consumers to discern product quality absent price signals, and will build 
consumers’ natural defenses to fraud. Those who relax the rationality assumption, 
on the other hand, assume that both buyers and sellers will react in unpredictable 
ways to incentives, and may be overly sanguine about the effect of selling speech 
on consumption.220 
However, these arguments both rely on assumptions about behavior that are 
untrue or overgeneralized.221 A more realistic description of puffery doctrine 
focuses on the actual relationship between behavior and sales talk, and not merely 
theorized views of such behavior. 
Jurists and regulatory authorities routinely assume that buyers of goods, 
services, and securities ignore puffing statements.222 This straightforward 
Two-Sided Claims on Product Attitude and Purchase Intention, 16 J. ADVER., Fall 1987, at 4, 11. 
219. Moderate puffing, by contrast, does not result in a loss of trust in the manufacturer. Id. at 13.
However, other experiments were to the contrary. One study examined the relationship between puffing 
in a print advertisement and consumers’ beliefs about a ballpoint pen. See generally Bruce G. Vanden 
Bergh & Leonard H. Reid, Effects of Product Puffery on Response to Print Advertisements, 3 J. 
CURRENT ISSUES RES. & ADVER. 123 (1980). One group (the treatment group) was shown an ad puffing 
the pen’s value and received a pen of “less value than expected”; a second group was given an ad 
containing factually accurate statements; and a third group saw a pessimistic ad and received a pen 
containing (naturally) better characteristics than expected. Id. at 130. The researchers found that puffing 
produced a “significantly more negative change” in sponsor evaluation, credibility, and intent to 
purchase the good in the future than both accurate and undersold advertisements. Id. Interestingly, 
accurate ads also resulted in negative perceptions of the message sponsor and intent to purchase, versus 
ads that undersold the product in the first instance. Id. 
220. See supra notes 198–219 and accompanying text (introducing the optimism bias). 
221. See supra note 197 (discussing the arguably self-defeating nature of puffery doctrine). 
222. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 cmt. c, subsec. 2 (1977) (“An intending
purchaser may not be justified in relying upon his vendor’s statement of the value, quality or other 
advantages of a thing that he is intending to sell as carrying with it any assurance that the thing is such 
as to justify a reasonable man in praising it so highly.”); see also Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., 388 
F.3d 990, 1009 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the term “high quality” comes under the category of sales 
puffery “upon which no reasonable person could rely in making a decision”); Williams v. Aztar Ind. 
Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding promotional casino mailings that stated 
“Players win!” and “the winning is big!” to be nothing more than sales puffery on which no person of 
ordinary prudence and comprehension would rely); Peter C. Ward, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: 
LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6.04 (1997): Policy Statement on Deception (1997) (stating that 
deception occurs “‘if there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the 
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances to the consumer’s detriment.’” (quoting Letter from
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application of many “individual [jurists’] personal theorizing”223 is in tension with 
real-world evidence of the utility of persuasive advertising.224 In any event, it is 
simply untrue. Marketing scholars have demonstrated that puffing statements are 
believed on their own terms and lead some individuals to further imply facts about 
the puffed speech that are untrue. This part details evidence of individuals’ actual 
experiences with puffing speech. 
A significant number of studies of sales talk show that “puffery is believed by 
large numbers of consumers.”225 In one early examination of nationally distributed 
commercials, marketing scholars found that, on average, 39.6 percent of puffing 
claims were “believed.”226 For example, 69 percent of respondents believed that 
Head & Shoulders shampoo “lathers nice”227 (under the FTC’s test, “nice” is 
probably an unfalsifiable claim that would be immunized puffery). In a different 
and rather unkind experiment, subjects were told by researchers that the coffee 
they were about to drink had “no bitterness.” The coffee actually had been made 
particularly bitter by overbrewing. After drinking the coffee, subjects who had 
seen the claim were significantly more likely to believe that the coffee was not 
bitter than subjects who had not seen the claim and drank the bitter brew.228 
James C. Miller, III, Chairman, to Hon. John D. Dingell, Oct. 14, 1983, reprinted at 1137 BNA ATRR 
689 (Oct. 27, 1983))). 
223. Klaus G. Grunert & Konrad Dedler, Misleading Advertising: In Search of a Measurement
Methodology, 4 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 153, 154 (1985). 
224. One scholar estimated that 58.5 percent of the assertions in common consumer advertisements
were subjective, and not factual, claims. See Terence A. Shimp, Social Psychological 
(Mis)Representations in Television Advertising, 13 J. CONSUMER AFF. 28, 35 (1978). 
225. Haan & Berkey, supra note 184, at 246 (citing studies); see Kamins & Marks, supra note 218,
at 6 (same); Vanden Bergh & Reid, supra note 219, at 123–24 (same); cf. Bruce G. Vanden Bergh & 
Leonard H. Reid, Puffery and Magazine Readership, 44 J. MKTG., Spring 1980, at 78 (finding that 
puffing in car advertisements did not increase the attention readers paid to the sales claims). 
226. Herbert J. Rotfeld & Kim B. Rotzoll, Is Advertising Puffery Believed?, 9 J. ADVER., Summer
1980, at 16, 19. 
227. Id. at 20. 
228. See Jerry C. Olson & Philip A. Dover, Cognitive Effects of Deceptive Advertising, 15 J.
MKTG. RES. 29, 32, 36–37 (1978). An interesting variation of persuasive-speech theory questions the 
effect of brands on stock-market prices. The evidence is varied. One study found that announcement of 
advertising-agency switches were correlated to declines in stock price. See generally Lynette Knowles 
Mathur & Ike Mathur, Is Value Associated with Initiating New Advertising Agency-Client Relations?, 
25 J. ADVER., Fall 1996, at 1 (finding also that announcements of new work for an already existing 
agency relationship were associated with a rising share price). Larger firms spending more on 
advertising experience significant gains in stock price and trading volume. See Keith W. Chauvin & 
Mark Hirschey, Advertising, R&D Expenditures, and the Market Value of the Firm, 22 FIN. MGMT., 
Winter 1993, at 128 (discussing the relationship among different potential determinants of stock price). 
Another study concluded that “markets react to advertising stimuli and, by extension, that some 
investors incorporate them into trading decisions.” James Karrh, Does Advertising Influence Investors? 
Evidence and Research Propositions, 26 J. CURRENT ISSUES RES. & ADVER., Fall 2004, at 1, 3. Karrh, a 
business-school professor, connects advertising to stock price through the lens of behavioral finance. 
According to Karrh, evidence of investor behavior can help to explain why advertising might affect 
investing and consuming behavior in similar ways. Id. at 4. Karrh explains that this effect might be 
more significant with investors who are comparatively less expert and less able to access management. 
Id. at 6–7. 
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At a more granular level, Ivan Preston has divided puffing statements into six 
types: best, best possible, better, specially good, good, and other subjective 
qualities.229 Several experiments have tested this spectrum to see if there is a 
hierarchy of persuasion between these types of puffing statements.230 One 
experiment found no statistically significant difference between the different types 
of puffery, except that customers were significantly less likely to believe 
“subjective” claims—such as “There’s a smile in every Hershey Bar”—than the 
more evaluative first five types231 (this is not surprising, as the claim is literally 
impossible). In each of the first five types of puffery, the mean response found the 
puffing speech neither believable nor unbelievable, but more respondents found 
the claim either “believable” or “very believable” than those who found it 
“unbelievable” or “very unbelievable.”232 
A separate research question asks if consumers believe the facts implied by 
puffing statements. Marketing researchers thinking about puffery have developed 
the idea of a “pragmatic implication.” For example, the statement “I can pick you 
up at eight,” while not assuring a pick-up, would be perceived as a promise if 
spoken by a friend who knew you needed a ride.233 To take an example from 
earlier in this Article,234 Yogurt’s claim to be “nature’s perfect food” might imply 
multiple facts, such as “Yogurt is made from natural ingredients” and “Yogurt kills 
infections.”235 
Studies have shown that consumers believe the pragmatic fact implications of 
puffing speech. Most experiments have found that approximately 40 percent of 
puffing speech is believed on its own terms, and a smaller percentage of implied 
fact claims are understood to be true.236 Belief in implied facts varies with 
listeners: “young adults confuse pragmatic implications with direct assertions 55 to 
80 percent of the time.”237 When given time to study advertisements, young adults 
outperformed older adults in being able to discriminate between fact and non-fact 
claims.238 
229. PRESTON, supra note 6, at 185–89. 
230. Haan & Berkey, supra note 184, at 244.
231. Id. at 249. 
232. Id. at 250 tbl.1. According to the study, 39 to 41 percent of respondents found the claim
“believable” or “very believable”; 27 to 34 percent found it “unbelievable” or “very unbelievable.” 
233. See, e.g., Gary J. Gaeth & Timothy B. Heath, The Cognitive Processing of Misleading
Advertising in Young and Old Adults: Assessment and Training, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 43, 43–44 
(1987) (citing studies). 
234. See generally In re Dannon Milk Prods., Inc., 61 F.T.C. 840 (1962). 
235. For a list of health claims commonly associated with yogurt consumption, see Vicki Koenig,
Yogurt’s History and Folklore, in Stonyfield Farms—Moos Press Releases, available at 
http://www.stonyfield.com/Wellness/MooslettersDisplay.cfm?moos_id=16 (last visited Mar. 13, 2006). 
236. Rotfeld & Rotzoll, supra note 226, at 19 (finding that 11 percent of implied-fact claims are
believed). 
237. Gaeth & Heath, supra note 233, at 44. 
238. Id. at 50. 
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A third dimension of the marketing literature examines the confusion of fact 
and puffery. A study examined whether claims based on facts were believed more 
than claims based on mere puffery. Factual claims, such as that a medicine was the 
“[b]rand children’s doctors recommend most” were believed at equivalent rates as 
a statement that the product provided “[f]ast and gentle” relief.239 Notably, the 
latter statement would be nonactionable puffery under current doctrine. This 
empirical finding severely undercuts the commonplace intuition—evident in each 
of the areas of doctrine discussed in Part II—that more factual specificity leads to 
customer belief.240 
Marketing scholars hypothesize that prior familiarity with goods increases the 
persuasive power of puffery.241 This familiarity encompasses “knowledge of, . . . 
experience with and loyalty to a product.”242 Haan and Berkey’s study of the 
gradients of puffery and the products and manufacturers selling them showed that a 
consumer’s experience with the product was the most significant factor that causes 
her to believe the puffing claim.243 Thus, in deciding whether to purchase a good, 
consumers believe and rely on puffery when they already know and like a product 
and trust the manufacturer.244 
The persuasiveness of puffing claims is intensely fact specific. One study, for 
example, tested ads that compared Motrin to Tylenol.245 Generally, consumers 
judged comparison claims to be more persuasive than self-boasting claims, but the 
difference depended on factors like format rather than content. Ads that compared 
products to each other were more persuasive when the comparisons appeared early 
in advertisements rather than later.246 
Thus, the economists’ view that consumers do not—in general—react to 
puffing speech by believing it for what it asserts is wrong. Even worse, consumers 
sometimes believe false facts that puffing speech implies. Moreover, repeated 
experiences with products appear to increase the distorting effects of puffing 
239. Herbert J. Rotfeld & Kim B. Rotzoll, Puffery vs. Fact Claims—Really Different?, 4 J.
CURRENT ISSUES RES. & ADVER. 85, 91 (1981). 
240. Cf. M.B. Holbrook, Beyond Attitude Structure: Toward the Informational Determinants of
Attitude, 5 J. MKTG. RES. 545, 548 (1978) (“[T]he factualness of a message should influence its 
subjective credibility, and this intervening cognitive response should in turn enhance acceptance of the 
message’s belief statements.”); Rotfeld & Rotzoll, supra note 239, at 102 (finding that fact claims such 
as “helps control dandruff” were believed at similar rates to puffing claims such as “makes hair look 
terrific”). 
241. See Haan & Berkey, supra note 184, at 246 (citing studies by Fazio, conducted in 1986 and
1989, that conclude that unfamiliar products or brands are more scrutinized than familiar ones). 
242. Id. (citing G.J. Tellis, Effective Frequency: One Exposure or Three Factors?, 37 J. ADVER.
RES., July–Aug. 1997, at 75–82). 
243. Id. at 253. 
244. Id. at 246 (citing studies). 
245. Michael J. Barone & Paul W. Miniard, How and when Factual Ad Claims Mislead
Consumers: Examining the Deceptive Consequences of Copy x Copy Interactions for Partial 
Comparative Advertisements, 36 J. MKTG. RES. 58 (1999). 
246. Id. at 72. 
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speech, making it difficult for consumers to learn and correct for falsehoods.247 
This effect is an important rejoinder to the argument—made by economists—that 
puffing speech could function to assure quality in a market of repeat purchasers.248 
However, the assumptions of optimism theorists appear to find more 
substantial support in the experimental literature.249 It is true, as the optimism bias 
would predict, that some buyers are unable to distinguish between truth and 
exaggerated lies. It is also true that some buyers appear to relate puffing speech to 
brand power, believing such speech when they are already predisposed to do so by 
virtue of prior product experiences. 
An important aspect of the above literature little explored by jurists is the 
finding that consumers react in different ways to puffing speech.250 Large 
segments of the market—but not the majority—believe sales talk for the truth of 
what it asserts. Smaller segments draw implications from puffing speech and 
believe them. Prior experiences with the product—which vary from consumer to 
consumer—affect belief, as does mood, age, and other demographic 
characteristics. If there is any general lesson to be taken from the literature, it is 
that puffing speech can seriously affect consumption preferences, and that small 
differences in the presentation and context of that speech may significantly change 
listeners’ processing of the information it conveys. 
What, then, to do? If consumers are sometimes deceived by puffing speech, 
how can judges and regulators best protect “good consumption”? As previous parts 
have explored, authorities’ ability to determine before the fact when puffing speech 
will result in false factual implications is quite limited, and top-down control might 
have the self-defeating effects explored in this Part. What is needed, then, is a 
theory of puffery and its harms that would: (1) make sure that only speech that 
misled consumers was regulated; (2) not lead consumers to be overly confident 
about the scope of the protections available to them; and (3) correct for the 
optimism bias experienced by some sellers and buyers. The next Part of this 
Article takes on the project of solving these problems. 
247. Cf. VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ch. 3, § 1, at 103 (Ann S. Schwier 
trans., Ann S. Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., 1971) (explaining that revealed preferences depend on 
observing repeated choices, so that prior learning can be fully incorporated). 
248. See supra notes 180–86 and accompanying text. One way to harmonize the puffery marketing 
literature with rational-choice theory was indirectly suggested by Becker and Murphy, who observed 
that “greater consumption of advertised goods [should] raise the marginal utility from, and the demand 
for, advertising.” Becker & Murphy, supra note 179, at 949. If we imagine advertising as a normal good 
that is complementary with the products it boosts, then it would make sense that demand for puffery—
expressed through belief in it—rises together with experience in the puffed product. The full workings 
of this connection are unfortunately beyond the scope of this Article. See Bagwell, supra note 177, at 
20–24 (summarizing the complementary theory of advertising). 
249. See, e.g., supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text (explaining how positive puffery may 
impact consumer purchases). 
250. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 6, at 672–76 (discussing the problem of different meanings to 
different consumers, or even to the same consumer in different contexts). 
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V. PUFFERY AND PERSUASION
In the preceding parts, I have offered an account of puffery doctrine founded 
on an idea of modulated coherence. The basic question that the defense asks is 
deceptively simple: Will the speech lead to “bad,” i.e., misled and inefficient, 
consumption? But the way that this question gets answered, through case-by-case 
application, creates constitutional and practical problems. The FTC, perhaps 
believing that its position is constitutionally required, has led many courts to 
assume that puffing speech is not believed and implies no facts. 
The First Amendment does not require this level of confusion in consumer 
protection. Although current commercial-speech jurisprudence is very much in 
flux, the Supreme Court might eventually settle on a doctrinal rule that permits 
banning speech which, when considering its content and the context of its 
expression, would mislead even a segment of the marketplace. 
Unfortunately, neither courts nor regulators can easily determine when 
puffery implies facts that are false. Courts are not experts in psychology, 
economics, statistics, or marketing, and therefore are unable to intuit the 
differences between good and bad speech as a matter of law. Regulators, who 
actually may be experts, are faced with a dilemma of either creating prophylactic 
rules, which are increasingly vulnerable to constitutional challenges, or relying on 
hindsight. Such hindsight judgments of puffing speech’s appropriate scope are 
liable to be infected by the behavioral biases251 and regulatory capture by 
industry.252 Applying the three experiments discussed earlier to find causation, 
implication/falsity, and intent may not impossible in every case. But the FTC has 
long refused to take puffery seriously, leaving to courts the job of governing most 
misleading speech. Legal authorities—especially in the securities and advertising 
contexts—treat puffery doctrine as a kind of semantic inquiry. They believe 
themselves capable of divining consumption behavior from first principles, without 
considering evidence of actual consumer reaction to puffing speech. As Part IV.C 
demonstrated, this interpretative approach has led authorities to adopt a distorted 
view of consumption. 
If we cannot trust courts and regulators to intuit an optimal amount of puffing 
speech, we should look to the other legal actors involved in the process. Current 
doctrine essentially puts the burden on buyers of stocks and services to avoid the 
harms that puffing speech creates. This decision has had pernicious effects. 
251. See Russell N. Laczniak & Sanford Grossbart, An Assessment of Assumptions Underlying the
Reasonable Consumer Element in Deceptive Advertising Policy, 9 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 85, 95 
(1990) (suggesting that experts are poor at evaluating puffing speech). See generally W. Kip Viscusi, 
Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 107 (2001) (examining the 
hindsight bias in how juries and judges analyze risk). 
252. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 202–06 
(2005) (reciting the “basic story” of the mechanism of regulatory capture). 
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First, it has encouraged sellers to expand their use of persuasive speech 
significantly.253 Thus, one student found that print advertising in Time contained 
less than half as many words in 2000 as in 1976.254 Persuasive messages that 
“elicit only emotional responses, omitting virtually all information”255 are more 
popular than ever.256 To the extent that most persuasive advertising could also be 
characterized as puffery, such an expansion casts some doubt on the economic 
model of non-regulated advertising advanced in Part IV.A.257 
Second, current doctrine encourages sellers to learn about the behavioral tics 
of buyers and exploit them. There is some evidence that sellers know that puffing 
speech works to encourage sales.258 One insight from that marketing research, 
well-publicized to advertising agencies, is that emotion sells more than logic. 
Specifically, consumers seek to avoid cognitive effort: the more information 
contained in an ad, the less persuasive it may be.259 More significantly, positive 
emotional effect, and not rational choice, drives purchasing decisions. 260 Humor 
sells more than facts.261 
Third, and most perniciously, current doctrine encourages sellers to target 
their puffing speech at those buyers who will be most likely to be convinced by it. 
253. See generally Hammer, supra note 181, at 438–44 (collecting evidence of a “noticeable
decrease in the quantity of information contained in advertisements”). 
254. Sarah C. Haan, Note, The “Persuasion Route” of the Law: Advertising and Legal Persuasion,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1288 (2000). 
255. Id. 
256. See Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020,
2047–49 (2005) (discussing the theory of “persuasion knowledge” as providing a more sophisticated 
view of customer behavior). 
257. This is because puffing speech is almost always immune from regulation. 
258. See, e.g., Olshavsky & Miller, supra note 217, at 19 (“It is commonly believed by advertisers
that a little positive exaggeration in product promotion favorably influences a consumer’s judgment of 
product quality.”); Preston, Regulatory Positions, supra note 43, at 341 (recounting letters written by 
advertising groups). Professor Hayden further argues that “[c]ommercial speech is a commodity like 
any other, whose price and availability are subject to the laws of supply and demand . . . ‘Thus the 
extent to which sellers invest in it will be determined by the extent to which consumers rely on it.’” 
Paul T. Hayden, A Goodly Apple Rotten at the Heart: Commercial Disparagement in Comparative 
Advertising as Common-Law Tortious Unfair Competition, 76 IOWA L. REV. 67, 88 (1990) (quoting 
remarks by Robert Reich, Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning, before the National Conference on 
the First Amendment and the Corporation (Mar. 16, 1979), reprinted in FTC TRADE REGULATION: 
ADVERTISING, RULEMAKING, AND NEW CONSUMER PROTECTION 39, 50–51 (1979)). 
259. Haan, supra note 254, at 1297. 
260. Uzma Khan et al., A Behavioral Decision Theory Perspective on Hedonic and Utilitarian
Choice, in INSIDE CONSUMPTION, supra note 182, at 144, 144–65 (collecting evidence and proposing 
model for when emotional choice predominates over rational choice, based on cycles of self-
attribution); see also Richard P. Bagozzi et al., The Role of Emotions in Goal-Directed Behavior, in 
THE WHY OF CONSUMPTION: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMER MOTIVES, GOALS, AND 
DESIRES 36, 37–48 (S. Ratneshwar et al. eds., 2000) (summarizing literature on the relationship 
between emotional effect and consumption). 
261. Haan, supra note 254, at 1300; see also Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme
Court: Rethinking the Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 99, 102–08 (2005) (noting the effect of emotional decision making in financial markets). 
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That is, because in most of its aspects,262 regulation of puffing speech treats 
consumers as homogenous, either deceived or not deceived as a group. Marketers 
who can identify specific groups within the class of consumers that are particularly 
vulnerable will be able to have their cake (immunity) and eat it too (exploitation of 
a small class of consumers). Thus, current doctrine creates an unwholesome 
paradox.263 Sellers increasingly rely on persuasive, puffing, speech, but are 
protected from liability because such speech is assumed not to work.264 Through 
learning strategies over time, marketers will “figure out” which types of puffing 
speech are most effective in building brands, selling implied facts that may not be 
true to particularly vulnerable sub-groups of the market.265 Buyers’ abilities to 
protect themselves by discovering fraud and learning from it are short-circuited 
because the power of puffing speech increases with exposure. 
Possibly in response to this potential increase in consumer harm, much of 
puffery doctrine and scholarship to date has focused on buyer behavior.266 This 
focus leads immediately to the constitutional problem discussed in Part III, which, 
as we have seen, equates the First Amendment’s protections to a theory  about 
when buyers will be misled by speech. Most proposals to reform current puffery 
defenses miss the import of this constitutional problem and argue that regulatory 
authorities could establish prophylactic rules preventing fraud. But such rules are 
constitutionally vulnerable. 
A focus on seller behavior provides a better alternative. In an important sense, 
puffing speech is like the output from a productive factory. Like all such outputs, 
puffing speech creates some socially beneficial effects. Unlike a factory, puffing 
262. With the exception of the one-on-one regimes in tort and contract law. 
263. Leighton, supra note 19, at 617. 
264. Haan & Berkey, supra note 184, at 245 (noting that “if puffery does not work, salespeople
and advertisers would not use it”); Hayden, supra note 258, at 86 (“It seems an odd legal theory indeed 
that would allow a speaker to try mightily to persuade an audience of the seriousness of a claim, yet 
permits the speaker’s actions to be defended on the ground that no one in the audience was entitled to 
take the claim seriously.”); Rotfeld & Rotzoll, supra note 239, at 87 (asking “if puffery is not believed, 
why is it used by advertisers?”); Robert G. Wyckham, Implied Superiority Claims, 27 J. ADVERTISING 
RES., Feb.–Mar. 1987, at 56, 60 (noting that it “seems logical” that advertisers using implied-superiority 
claims “are not unaware of the nature of consumer interpretation”). 
265. As a reader of this Article in draft commented, “If buyers can’t or won’t learn to self-protect 
against fraud, and competitive buyers know this, then sellers will offer such buyers alternative benefits 
to capture market share.” For example, sellers of goods will compete on price in markets where puffery 
“drowns out” quality comparisons. But cf. Bagwell, supra note 177, at 144 (noting that the “competitive 
pressure that is normally associated with price advertising may be suppressed when pricing is complex 
and some consumers are thus naïve”). Are consumers receiving such lower prices worse off? That 
answer would seem to depend on a more nuanced theory of consumer welfare than is currently 
available. 
266. But cf. Craswell, supra note 6, at 678–79 (proposing a new definition of deception, 
administered by a regulatory agency, that would turn on the costs and benefits of speech to buyers and 
sellers). Craswell’s view is in many ways similar to mine, except that his proposal (like current 
doctrine) assumes that authorities can appropriately draw lines between deceptive and nondeceptive 
speech, whereas I assume that the cost/benefit weighing in the first instance ought to be done by 
speakers. 
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speakers help society, not by fabricating widgets, but instead by increasing 
consumer satisfaction with their purchases, by reducing search costs and providing 
quality assurances through brands, and generally by fulfilling both buyer, and 
seller, optimistic world-views. 
But like a factory, puffing speech also pollutes. Some percentage of hearers of 
puffing speech believe it as gospel; smaller percentages understand the speech to 
imply facts that are false. Consumption as a result of this polluted speech is not 
welfare maximizing. But regulators and courts, as we have seen, are either unable 
or constitutionally prohibited from making rules distinguishing polluting from 
clean speech.267 
Thus, puffing-speech doctrine must confront an interesting variant of the 
classic negative externality problem from the field of tort law.268 Puffing speakers 
create informational burdens currently borne by buyers, without compensation 
from sellers.269 As a result of this externalization of costs, speakers may currently 
be puffing too much: the law fails to effectively regulate their conduct because of 
its focus on “good” and “bad” consumption. 
The problem with the “good” and “bad” consumption approach is that it fails 
to recognize speakers’ incentives to make speech intentionally more distorting. Jon 
Hanson and Douglas Kysar have explored a variant of this phenomenon in the 
products-liability arena.270 Their research focuses on the manipulability of 
consumer behavior271: “Once it is acknowledged that consumer risk perceptions 
may be affected by, for instance, the manner in which information is framed, then 
it becomes inevitable that manufacturers will exploit those framing effects in a way 
that maximizes manufacturer profits.”272 They describe the vast industry devoted 
to developing better techniques to manipulate purchase decisions273 and conclude 
267. Authorities attempting to regulate puffing speech face both type 1 (failing to capture
deceptive conduct) and type 2 (overdeterring utility-maximizing speech) risks. My thesis suggests that 
this line-drawing task is beyond their capabilities as currently constituted. 
268. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 613 (5th ed.
1991) (“An activity is said to generate a beneficial or detrimental externality if that activity causes 
incidental benefits or damages to others, and no corresponding compensation is provided to or paid by 
those who generate the externality.”). 
269. Notably, the puffing externality depends entirely on the processing of the “pollution” (speech)
by the buyer. That is, we should imagine a factory located in a small town, where 40 percent of the 
population, because of a preexisting asthmatic condition, is vulnerable to the particulates in smoke, 
while 60 percent is totally immune. The vulnerable subset of the population processes the smoke and 
becomes quite sick, just like the vulnerable subset of the consumer population that believes puffery and 
is confused by it. 
270. See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 178; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) 
[hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 
(2000) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, A Response]. 
271. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 178, at 721–42. 
272. Id. at 724. 
273. Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note 270, at 1429–37. 
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that evidence of manipulation of consumer preferences reinvigorates the case for 
enterprise liability.274 
Enterprise liability is, simply, a way to redistribute legally cognizable harms 
away from consumers and toward their originators.275 The case for enterprise 
liability is especially strong where consumers are unable to self-correct their 
behavior and reduce the likelihood of suffering a legal injury.276 Correspondingly, 
attacks on enterprise liability lament its inability to properly regulate the amount of 
consumer care277 and its alleged pernicious effects on the insurance market.278 
Nevertheless, as Hanson and Kysar observe, the desirability of enterprise 
liability turns on its relative success in properly deterring legal harm, as compared 
with regulatory and negligence alternatives. In the puffery context, the FTC’s 
policy has the inevitable effect of permitting manufacturers to actually mislead 
some segment of the market through the transmission of false, implied facts. 
Similarly, in the securities context, courts immunizing forward-looking puffery 
deny some investors protection against disclosures that defrauded them. 
I argue that we should apply these insights to the puffery defense by creating 
a regime of “presumed liability” for puffing speech. Presumed liability is distinct 
in significant ways from enterprise liability. I sketch out only the outline of this 
approach here, leaving a more complete development for a subsequent article. 
Briefly, presumed liability for puffery would mean that if a court or a 
regulator identified puffery as a component of a particular piece of seller speech, it 
would be presumed to imply false factual claims that were relied upon.279 
Speakers would then have the burden of rebutting the presumption. They 
could do this by making one of three evidentiary showings: (1) they did not intend 
to mislead consumers; (2) there was no reliance by most of the audience; or (3) the 
speech implied no false facts. 
To understand why intent is relevant to the inquiry, imagine two stock 
disclosures, both containing the following phrase: “Next year, our company’s 
prospects are exceedingly strong.” In both situations, some buyers rush to the 
market based on this puffery. As it turns out, in the first situation, the disclosing 
entity honestly believed the statement; in the second, the disclosing entity did not 
believe the statement and hoped to use the puffery to create a short-term stock 
bubble as a prelude to an insider sale. 
274. See generally Hanson & Kysar, A Response, supra note 270. 
275. Id. at 268–71. 
276. Id. at 268–69. 
277. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and
Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 250 
(2000). 
278. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990) (discussing the 
relationship between insurance and enterprise liability). 
279. The claims would be presumed false because of the heterogeneous market. Listeners imply a
variety of facts from puffing speech. At least some of those facts are likely to be in tension with others, 
and some will be false. 
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The law generally recognizes that the second seller is more culpable than the 
first, through its emphasis on scienter. Puffing doctrine should move toward a 
more intense focus on scienter and manipulation, and away from a current focus on 
rational consumption that leads courts to idealized models of behavior that are 
weakly predictive of actual consumption practices. By contrast, a focus on intent 
and motive is well within legal authorities’ traditional zone of competence. 
Courts should also consider evidence of actual reliance and implied false 
facts. Simply intending to manipulate consumers toward non-maximizing ends 
cannot be the sufficient condition for liability. Instead, liability for puffery should 
result from success at convincing consumers to buy when a sufficient percentage 
of the market has relied on facts implied from puffing speech that are false.280 
In practice, rebutting the intent, reliance, and causation presumptions would 
require sellers to present laboratory or empirical studies of marketplace reaction to 
puffery. Sellers likely will have cheaper access to this information than courts and 
buyers. Sources of proof might include: (1) expert determination based on 
hindsight judgments;281 (2) consumer surveys as to their perceptions of whether 
they were misled; and (3) deception as measured by the speech’s effect on “certain 
of the consumer’s cognitive variables.”282 
For example, in the securities context, sellers could rebut the presumption by 
showing that a stock’s price did not move as a result of the puffery—a straight-
forward application of current loss-causation techniques. In the warranty and 
promissory estoppel contexts, the law would change very little: factfinders would 
continue to ask about the relationship between the parties to look for causation and 
falsity as a product of the seller’s persuasive power. In the FTC context, 
presumably, the current doctrine would be literally reversed. 
The presumed-liability proposal has many advantages. First and most 
importantly, sellers would be forced to internalize the costs of their misleading 
speech. As a result, they would likely pass along those costs to purchasers through 
(in the product/service context) higher prices, or through (in the stock context) 
reduced likelihood to opine in disclosures or overall reduced stock prices. 
Consumers and investors would therefore be notified of the true price of goods and 
would reallocate their purchase decisions accordingly. 
Second, presumed liability for puffing speech would make sellers more likely 
to test the implied factual claims of their puffery before using them in sales 
presentations. Such pre-testing could help sellers establish the scienter part of their 
defense to charges of fraud and would encourage sellers to create more accurate 
280. I leave open the exact percentage of the marketplace that would have to imply the facts in
question. Needless to say, requiring a seller to prove that no one implied facts from speech that were 
false would put it in an impossible position. One component of the “harm” analysis would necessarily 
depend on the costs of prosecuting and investigating fraud in distinct markets. 
281. However, there is evidence that closer attention to puffing claims by experts decreases, not
increases, the advertising’s impact and believability. See, e.g., Laczniak & Grossbart, supra note 251, at 
95 (suggesting that these findings have implications for the FTC’s policy on deception). 
282. Grunert & Dedler, supra note 223, at 155. 
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speech.283 As significantly, the presumption would help to correct the effects of 
seller-optimism bias. Sellers would soon learn of the many (false) expectations that 
listeners take from seller’s vague and gauzy expressions of hope. 
Third, by permitting sellers the latitude to deceive a small number of 
particularly credulous buyers (i.e., by setting a threshold for the percentage of 
consumers who believe a particular implied-fact claim), puffery doctrine could be 
made to conform to constitutional guarantees and would be significantly less 
vulnerable to challenge than proposals to ban persuasive advertising entirely.284 
Moreover, this aspect of the proposal would recognize that the increasing 
availability of consumer information on the Internet creates the possibility that 
puffing speech will be less effective in the future than it is today. 
Fourth, the reform I have outlined would help move legal authorities toward a 
more coherent doctrine. As this Article has explored, the law now encourages 
judges and regulators to intuit the relationship between puffery and behavior. The 
presumed-liability approach, by contrast, is based on actual evidence of behavior 
and encourages parties to submit additional data to authorities about intent, 
reliance, and causation in a format that authorities are well positioned to process 
(i.e., through the adversarial process). Although sellers’ rebuttals and buyers’ 
counter-rebuttals may result in a battle of the experts before a jury regarding the 
effects of puffing speech, the law’s truth-seeking function in such a context is more 
developed than by a single judge’s arm-chair theorizing. 
Fifth, my approach would go some way toward resolving the puffery 
“paradox.”285 A common objection to much of the current doctrine is that sellers 
consistently demonstrate that puffery is economically valuable speech, but are 
protected from liability by jurists claiming that it is not. This Article has suggested 
that the paradox is somewhat overstated. Sellers may be overoptimistic about their 
products and thus do not always intend to mislead when they puff.286 Nonetheless, 
the central insight of the paradox is that puffery must be economically 
consequential for it to be so prevalent. My approach recognizes that the economic 
aspect of puffery is mixed: it produces both costs and benefits. While current 
doctrine ignores the costs of puffery and only vaguely accounts for its benefits, 
presumed liability deals with these variables directly. 
However, an important potential objection to consider is the overdeterrence of 
a commercially valuable form of speech. Investigating the implied factual claims 
of sales talk is likely to prove expensive, especially for smaller businesses. We 
might see puffery driven out of some segments of the marketplace entirely 
283. See, e.g., James Heckman, “Puffery” Claims No Longer So Easy to Make, 34 MKTG. NEWS,
Feb. 14, 2000, at 6 (discussing a rise in manufacturer care after private-party Lanham Act litigation 
increased the focus on puffery defenses). 
284. See, e.g., Hammer, supra note 181, at 480–90 (proposing a ban of non-informational
messages in advertising and defending it against constitutional attack). 
285. See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text (discussing the puffery paradox). 
286. This result holds even for sophisticated sellers because the law does not now force them to
internalize the factual implications of selling speech. 
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(although if puffery is commercially valuable enough, sellers will continue to use it 
and absorb resulting liability costs). But the likelihood of this scenario should be 
somewhat discounted given the law’s experiences with the sales of consumer 
goods under the UCC’s restrictive-puffery policy. Because sellers still puff 
notwithstanding potential warranties, it seems hard to believe that the advertising 
market would be cleansed of exaggeration the day after presumed-liability policy 
for puffery goes into effect, or that stock disclosures would be devoid of all hype. 
Rather, the amount of fraud resulting from puffery would be moved to a more 
optimal level, which would better distribute puffing speech’s true costs and 
benefits in the marketplace. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Puffery and statements of fact are mutually exclusive . . . . Defining 
puffery broadly provides advertisers and manufacturers considerable 
leeway to craft their statements, allowing the free market to hold 
advertisers and manufacturers accountable for their statements, ensuring 
vigorous competition, and protecting legitimate commercial speech.287 
The court in American Italian Pasta Co. articulated an issue that is at the 
heart of modern First Amendment, economic- and consumer-protection debates: 
what is the law’s role in protecting consumers from their own bad decisions? The 
puffery defense is an important locus of those debates. However, most of the 
scholarly discussion of puffery to date has treated it as a byproduct of the law of 
fraud or a holdover from previous caveat emptor traditions. 
This Article has explored puffery as a compelling topic in its own right. For 
economists, the question of what to do with persuasive but literally nonfalse 
speech goes to the very heart of new and evolving theories of consumption 
behavior. For constitutional scholars, similarly, puffery is at the crux of the 
question of whether and how the First Amendment protects misleading speech. For 
behavioralists, puffery’s powerful persuasive effect is yet more evidence 
suggesting the value of expanding liability to force sellers to internalize the 
cognitive costs of their products and services.288 
The presumed-liability approach I have outlined is only one way to approach 
the problems posed by puffery doctrine, but it is most in tune with current research 
about consumption, as well as the emerging constitutional framework protecting 
commercial speech. Nevertheless, my approach might be vulnerable to critiques. 
All regimes of expanded liability for speech risk over-deterrence and chilling of 
pro-competitive speech. Further work on this topic might help us to quantify these 
costs and determine whether my liability solution is preferable to the status quo. 
287. See Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 2004). 
288. But cf. David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical
and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 414–15 (2002) (explaining that paternalism has been the 
dominant solution in the legal literature to increased sophistication about consumer reaction to legal 
rules). 
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I cannot, in conclusion, leave you with a false implication. I am not the first to 
try to sell a piece of scholarship using puffing speech.289 Nor am I the first to 
attempt to use highly vivid examples of puffery to draw the reader into an 
otherwise technical and doctrinal morass.290 Nonetheless, the title of this article 
hopefully serves as more than a mere misleading adornment. To the extent that you 
found yourself drawn in by a promise of comparative superiority, and feel let 
down, I will have demonstrated at least part of the point I had intended to make. So 
sue me. 
289. See, e.g., Burt A. Lazar, This Column Is the Best One You’ll Ever Read, MKTG. NEWS, Aug.
15, 2005, at 8 (describing attributes of puffery doctrine and advising caution in making puffing 
statements). See generally Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for False 
Advertising, 45 FLA. L. REV. 487 (1993) (proposing only minor changes to false-advertising law). 
290. Leighton, supra note 19, at 615 (“You are about to enter a discussion involving over-the-top
sales pitches for pasta, pizza, killer bee movies and roach bait, all of which were challenged in false 
advertising cases brought under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.”). 
